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Abstract
Auxiliary variables are often needed for verifying that an implementation is
correct with respect to a higher-level specification. They augment the formal
description of the implementation without changing its semantics—that is, the
set of behaviors that it describes. This paper explains rules for adding history,
prophecy, and stuttering variables to TLA+ specifications, ensuring that the
augmented specification is equivalent to the original one. The rules are explained
with toy examples, and they are used to verify the correctness of a simplified
version of a snapshot algorithm due to Afek et al.
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1 Introduction
With state-based methods, checking that an implementation satisfies a higher-
level specification requires describing how the higher-level concepts in the speci-
fication are represented by the lower-level data structures of the implementation.
This approach was first proposed in the domain of sequential systems by Hoare
in 1972 [5]. Hoare called the description an abstraction function. The general-
ization to concurrent systems was called a refinement mapping by Abadi and
Lamport [2]. They observed that constructing a refinement mapping may re-
quire adding auxiliary variables to the implementation—variables that do not
alter the behavior of the actual variables and need not be implemented.
This paper is about adding auxiliary variables to TLA+ specifications. The
ideas we present should be applicable to other state-based specification methods,
but we make no attempt to translate them into those other methods. We hope
that a future paper will present the basic ideas in a language-independent way
and will contain soundness and completeness proofs. Our goal here is to teach
engineers writing TLA+ specifications how to add auxiliary variables when they
need them.
We assume the reader can understand TLA+ specifications. A basic under-
standing of refinement mappings will be helpful but isn’t necessary. TLA+ and
refinement mappings are explained in the book Specifying Systems [8] and in
material listed on the TLA web page [7].
This is a long paper, in part because it contains 25 figures with actual
TLA+ specifications. The paper contains hyperlinks, and we recommend reading
the pdf version on line. If you are doing that, you can download the source files
for all the TLA+ specifications described in this paper by clicking here. Other-
wise, you can find the URL in the reference list [6]. We expect that engineers will
have to study the specifications carefully to learn how to add auxiliary variables
to their specifications.
We explain three kinds of auxiliary variables: history, prophecy, and stut-
tering variables. History variables record information about the system’s past
behavior. They have been used since at least the 1970s [9]. They were some-
times called “ghost” variables. Prophecy variables predict the future behavior
of the system. They were introduced by Abadi and Lamport in 1991 [2]. The
need for them was also implicit in an example presented in Herlihy and Wing’s
classic paper on linearizability [4]. We found the original prophecy variables
very difficult to use in practice. The prophecy variables described here are new,
and our experience with them so far indicates that they are reasonably easy
to use in practice. Stuttering variables add “stuttering” steps—ones that leave
the specification’s actual variables unchanged. Abadi and Lamport originally
used prophecy variables to add stuttering steps, but we have found it better to
introduce stuttering steps with a separate kind of variable.
We will mostly ignore liveness and consider only safety specifications. The
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canonical form of a TLA+ specification consists of a safety specification of the
form Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars conjoined with a liveness condition. An auxiliary vari-
able is added by modifying the safety specification, but leaving the liveness con-
dition unchanged. Liveness therefore poses no problem for auxiliary variables
and is discussed only briefly.
2 Refinement Mappings
We will illustrate refinement mappings with a simple, useless example. A user
presents a server with a sequence of integer inputs. The server responds to each
input value i with one of the following outputs: Hi if i is the largest number
input so far, Lo if it’s the smallest number input so far, Both if it’s both, and
None if it’s neither. We declare Hi , Lo, Both, and None in a constants
statement. They are assumed not to be integers.
2.1 Specification MinMax1
Our first specification appears in a module named MinMax1. It describes the
interaction of the user and the server with two variables: a variable x to hold
an input or a response, and a variable turn that indicates whether it’s the user’s
turn to input a value or the server’s turn to respond. The specification also uses
a variable y to hold the set of values input so far. The initial predicate is
Init
∆
= ∧ x = None
∧ turn = “input”
∧ y = {}
The next-state relation Next equals InputNum ∨ Respond where InputNum is
the user’s input action and Respond is the server’s output action. The definition
of InputNum is simple:
InputNum
∆
= ∧ turn = “input”
∧ turn ′ = “output”
∧ x ′ ∈ Int
∧ y ′ = y
To define the Respond action, we must first define operators setMax and setMin
so that, for any finite nonempty set S of integers, setMax (S ) and setMin(S ) are
the maximum and minimum element, respectively, of S . The definitions are:
setMax (S )
∆
= choose t ∈ S : ∀ s ∈ S : t ≥ s
setMin(S )
∆
= choose t ∈ S : ∀ s ∈ S : t ≤ s
The definition of Respond is:
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Respond
∆
= ∧ turn = “output”
∧ turn ′ = “input”
∧ y ′ = y ∪ {x}
∧ x ′ = if x = setMax (y ′)
then if x = setMin(y ′) then Both else Hi
else if x = setMin(y ′) then Lo else None
Note that action InputNum is enabled iff turn equals “input”, and actionRespond
is enabled iff turn equals “output”. The complete specification is the formula
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
where vars is the tuple 〈x , turn, y 〉 of variables. The module MinMax1 we have
written thus far is shown in Figure 1.
2.2 The Hiding Operator ∃
Recall that a behavior is a sequence of states, where a state is an assignment
of values to all possible variables. For specification Spec of module MinMax1,
the interesting part of the state is the assignment of values to x , turn, and y.
Our specification allows all other variables to have any value at any state of any
behavior.
The purpose of this specification is to describe the interaction of the user
and the server. This interaction is described by the values of x and turn. The
value of y is needed only to describe how the values of x and turn can change.
We consider x and turn to be the externally visible or observable values of
the specification and y to be an internal variable. A philosophically correct
specification of our user/server system would allow only behaviors in which the
values of x and turn are as specified by Spec, but would not constrain the value
of y. We can write such a specification in terms of the temporal-logic operator ∃ .
For any temporal formula F and variable v , the formula ∃ v :F is defined
approximately as follows. A behavior σ satisfies ∃ v :F iff there exists a behavior
τ satisfying F such that τ is identical to σ except for the values its states assign
to v . The precise definition is more complicated because a temporal formula
of TLA+ may neither require nor prohibit stuttering steps, but we will use
the approximate definition for now. The operator ∃ is much like the ordinary
existential quantifier ∃ except that ∃ v :F asserts the existence not of a single
value for v that makes F true but rather of a sequence of values, one for each state
in the behavior, that makes F true on the behavior. This temporal existential
quantifier ∃ satisfies most of the properties of ordinary quantification. For
example, if the variable v does not occur in formula F , then ∃ v :F is equivalent
to F . We sometimes read the formula ∃ v :F as “F with v hidden”.
The philosophically correct specification of the MinMax1 system should con-
sist of formula Spec with y hidden. The obvious way to write this specification
is ∃ y : Spec . However, we can’t do that for the following reason. Suppose 5
module MinMax1
extends Integers
setMax (S )
∆
= choose t ∈ S : ∀ s ∈ S : t ≥ s
setMin(S )
∆
= choose t ∈ S : ∀ s ∈ S : t ≤ s
constants Lo, Hi , Both, None
assume {Lo, Hi , Both, None} ∩ Int = {}
variables x , turn, y
vars
∆
= 〈x , turn, y〉
Init
∆
= ∧ x = None
∧ turn = “input”
∧ y = {}
InputNum
∆
= ∧ turn = “input”
∧ turn ′ = “output”
∧ x ′ ∈ Int
∧ y ′ = y
Respond
∆
= ∧ turn = “output”
∧ turn ′ = “input”
∧ y ′ = y ∪ {x}
∧ x ′ = if x = setMax (y ′)
then if x = setMin(y ′) then Both else Hi
else if x = setMin(y ′) then Lo else None
Next
∆
= InputNum ∨ Respond
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Figure 1: Module MinMax1.
a module M defines exp to equal some expression. TLA+ does not allow the
expression
{v ∈ exp : v2 > 42}(2.1)
to appear at any point in module M where v is already declared or defined.
Since exp must be defined for the expression to have a meaning, this means that
(2.1) is illegal if v is a declared variable that appears in the definition of exp.
Similarly, the formula ∃ y : Spec is illegal because y appears in the definition of
Spec.1
1There are languages for writing math precisely that allow expression (2.1) even if v is 6
There are ways to write the formula Spec with v hidden in TLA+. The
most convenient ones involve writing it in another module that instantiates
module MinMax1. Chapter 4 of Specifying Systems [8] explains one way to do
this. However, there’s little reason to do it since the TLA+ tools cannot check
specifications written with ∃ . (The TLAPS proof system may eventually be able
to reason about it.) Instead, we take the formula ∃ y : Spec to be an abbreviation
for the formula ∃ y : [[Spec]] , where [[Spec]] is the formula obtained from Spec by
expanding all definitions. Formula [[Spec]] contains only: TLA+ primitives; the
constants Hi , Lo, Both, and None; and the variables x , turn, and y. Thus
∃ y : Spec is meaningful in a context in which x and turn are declared variables.
If used in a context in which y already has a meaning, we interpret ∃ y : Spec
to be the formula obtained from ∃ y : [[Spec]] by replacing y everywhere with a
new symbol.
What it means to expand all definitions in an expression is not as simple as
it might seem. Consider the following definition:
NotUnique(a)
∆
= ∃i : i 6= a(2.2)
It’s clear that the following theorem is true:
theorem ∀a :NotUnique(a)(2.3)
Now suppose we follow the definition of NotUnique with:
constant i
theorem NotUnique(i)
(2.4)
Theorem (2.3) obviously implies the theorem of (2.4). However, a naive expan-
sion of the definition of NotUnique tells us that [[NotUnique(i)]] equals ∃i : i 6= i ,
which equals false. The problem is clear: the bound identifier i in the defi-
nition of NotUnique is not the same i as the one declared in the constant
declaration. The following definition of NotUnique is equivalent to (2.2)
NotUnique(a)
∆
= ∃jku : jku 6= a
and with the naive expansion of this definition, [[NotUnique(i)]] equals the true
formula ∃jku : jku 6= i of (2.4).
The easiest way to define the meaning of expanding all definitions in an
expression is to consider (2.2) to define NotUnique(a) to equal something like
∃v 743 : v 743 6= a , where v 743 is an identifier that cannot be used anywhere
else. In general, every bound identifier in a definition is replaced by some unique
identifier.
already declared. In such a language, ∃ y : Spec would be equivalent to ∃ w : Spec for any
identifier w , which means it would be equivalent to Spec.
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Recursive definitions are not a problem for complete expansion of definitions
because in TLA+, a recursive definition is just an abbreviation for a non-recursive
one. For example
f [i ∈ Nat ]
∆
= if i = 0 then 1 else i ∗ f [i − 1]
is an abbreviation for
f
∆
= choose f : f = [i ∈ Nat 7→ if i = 0 then 1 else i ∗ f [i − 1]]
so the bound identifier f to the right of the “
∆
=” is not the same symbol as the
f being defined. (A recursive operator definition is an abbreviation for a much
more complicated ordinary definition.)
2.3 Specification MinMax2
The specification of our system in module MinMax1 uses the variable y to re-
member the set of all values that the user has input. Module MinMax2 specifies
the same user/server interaction that remembers only the smallest and largest
values input so far, using the variables min and max . Representing the initial
state, before any values have been input, is a little tricky. It would be simpler if
the standard Integers module defined a value ∞ such that −∞ < i <∞ for all
integers i . So, we will write the spec pretending that it did. Afterwards, we’ll
describe how to obtain an actual TLA+ spec.
The initial predicate of the specification is:
Init
∆
= ∧ x = None
∧ turn = “input”
∧min =∞
∧max = −∞
The user’s InputNum action is the same as for theMinMax1 specification, except
it leaves min and max rather than y unchanged:
InputNum
∆
= ∧ turn = “input”
∧ turn ′ = “output”
∧ x ′ ∈ Int
∧ unchanged 〈min, max 〉
Here is the system’s Respond action:
Respond
∆
= ∧ turn = “output”
∧ turn ′ = “input”
∧min ′ = if x ≤ min then x else min
∧max ′ = if x ≥ max then x else max
∧ x ′ = if x = max ′
then if x = min ′ then Both else Hi
else if x = min ′ then Lo else None 8
As usual, the complete specification is
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
where this time vars is the tuple 〈x , turn,min,max 〉 of variables.
To turn this into a TLA+ specification, we replace ∞ and −∞ by two con-
stants Infinity and MinusInfinity. In the definition of Respond , we replace
x ≤ min and x ≥ max by IsLeq(x ,min) and IsGeq(x ,max ), where IsLeq and
IsGeq are defined by
IsLeq(i , j )
∆
= (j = Infinity) ∨ (i ≤ j )
IsGeq(i , j )
∆
= (j = MinusInfinity) ∨ (i ≥ j )
These definitions must be preceded by declarations or definitions of Infinity and
MinusInfinity. They can equal any values, except that they must not be equal
and neither of them should be an integer—otherwise, the spec wouldn’t mean
what we want it to mean. We could declare Infinity and MinusInfinity in a
constant declaration and then add an assume statement asserting that they
aren’t in Int . However, we prefer to define them like this:
Infinity
∆
= choose n : n /∈ Int
MinusInfinity
∆
= choose n : n /∈ (Int ∪ {Infinity})
This completes module MinMax2, which is shown in its entirety in Figure 2.
As before, we consider x and turn to be the externally visible variables, and
min and max to be internal variables. The philosophically correct specifica-
tion, which hides the internal variables min and max , is ∃min,max : Spec . Of
course, this is an abbreviation for ∃ min : (∃ max : Spec ), which is equivalent to
∃max : (∃min : Spec ).
2.4 The Relation Between the Two Specifications
Using the standard TLA+ naming convention, we have given the two specifica-
tions the same name Spec. To distinguish them, let Spec1 be the specification
Spec of module MinMax1 and Spec2 be the Spec of module MinMax2.
It should be clear that both specifications describe the same behavior of the
external variables x and turn. This means that if we hide the internal variable
y of Spec1 and the internal variables min and max of Spec2, we should obtain
equivalent specifications. More precisely, we expect to this to be true:
(∃ y : Spec1) ≡ (∃min,max : Spec2)(2.5)
This formula is equivalent to the conjunction of these two formulas
(∃ y : Spec1) ⇒ (∃ min,max : Spec2)(2.6)
(∃ min,max : Spec2) ⇒ (∃ y : Spec1)(2.7) 9
module MinMax2
extends Integers , Sequences
constants Lo, Hi , Both, None
assume {Lo, Hi , Both, None} ∩ Int = {}
Infinity
∆
= choose n : n /∈ Int
MinusInfinity
∆
= choose n : n /∈ (Int ∪ {Infinity})
IsLeq(i , j )
∆
= (j = Infinity) ∨ (i ≤ j )
IsGeq(i , j )
∆
= (j = MinusInfinity) ∨ (i ≥ j )
variables x , turn, min, max
vars
∆
= 〈x , turn, min, max 〉
Init
∆
= ∧ x = None
∧ turn = “input”
∧min = Infinity
∧max = MinusInfinity
InputNum
∆
= ∧ turn = “input”
∧ turn ′ = “output”
∧ x ′ ∈ Int
∧ unchanged 〈min, max 〉
Respond
∆
= ∧ turn = “output”
∧ turn ′ = “input”
∧min ′ = if IsLeq(x , min) then x else min
∧max ′ = if IsGeq(x , max ) then x else max
∧ x ′ = if x = max ′ then if x = min ′ then Both else Hi
else if x = min ′ then Lo else None
Next
∆
= InputNum ∨ Respond
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Figure 2: Module MinMax2.
We verify (2.5) by separately verifying (2.6) and (2.7). We first consider (2.6).
Formula (2.6) asserts of a behavior σ that if there exists some way of as-
signing values to y in the states of σ to make it satisfy Spec1, then σ satisfies
∃min,max : Spec2 . Since the variable y does not appear in ∃ min,max : Spec2 ,
changing the values of y in the states of σ doesn’t affect whether it satisfies that
formula. This implies that to verify (2.6), it suffices to show that any behavior
σ that satisfies Spec1 also satisfies ∃min,max : Spec2 . In other words, to verify 10
(2.6), it suffices to verify
Spec1 ⇒ (∃min,max : Spec2)(2.8)
To verify (2.8), we must show that for any behavior σ that satisfies Spec1, there
exists a way of assigning values to the variables min and max in the states of σ
that makes the resulting behavior satisfy Spec2. A standard way of doing that is
to find explicit expressions min and max such that, if in each state of a behavior
we assign to the variables min and max the values of min and max in that
state, then the resulting behavior satisfies Spec2. We do this by showing that
any behavior satisfying Spec1 satisfies the formula obtained by substituting min
formin andmax formax in Spec2. Let’s write that formula [[Spec2]], emphasizing
that we must expand all definitions in Spec2 before substituting min for min
and max for max . So, we verify (2.8) by verifying
Spec1 ⇒ [[Spec2]](2.9)
We can write formula [[Spec2]] (or more precisely, a formula equivalent to it) in
module MinMax1 as follows. We first add the statement
M
∆
= instance MinMax2 with min ← min, max ← max
For every defined symbol def in moduleMinMax2, this statement definesM !def
to be equivalent to [[def ]], the formula whose definition is obtained by substi-
tuting min for min and max for max in the formula obtained by expanding
all definitions in the definition of def in MinMax2.2 This instance statement
therefore defines M !Spec to be equivalent to [[Spec2]], allowing us to write (2.9)
in module MinMax1 as the theorem:
theorem Spec ⇒ M !Spec
We can write a TLA+ proof of this theorem and check it with the TLAPS
theorem prover. We can also have TLC check this theorem by creating a model
for module MinMax1 with specification Spec that substitutes a finite set of
integers for Int and checks the property M !Spec. But before we can do that,
we have to determine what the expressions min and max are in the instance
statement.
Formula (2.9) asserts that in a behavior σ satisfying Spec1, if in each state
of σ we assign to min and max the values of min and max in that state, then
the resulting behavior satisfies Spec2. One way of thinking about this is that in
a behavior satisfying Spec1, the values of min and max simulate the values that
Spec2 requires min and max to assume.
A little thought reveals that min and max should be defined as indicated in
this statement:
2Note that the declared constants Hi , Lo, Both, and None of module MinMax2 have been
implicitly instantiated by the constants of the same name declared in MinMax1. 11
Infinity
∆
= choose n : n /∈ Int
MinusInfinity
∆
= choose n : n /∈ (Int ∪ {Infinity})
M
∆
= instance MinMax2
with min ← if y = {} then Infinity else setMin(y),
max ← if y = {} then MinusInfinity else setMax (y)
Figure 3: Additions to module MinMax1.
M
∆
= instance MinMax2
with min ← if y = {} then Infinity else setMin(y),
max ← if y = {} then MinusInfinity else setMax (y)
Of course, we need to define Infinity and MinusInfinity before we can write that
statement. They should be defined to be the same values as in MinMax2, so
we just copy the definitions from that module into module MinMax1. We have
added the statements in Figure 3 to the bottom of the module in Figure 1
2.5 Refinement In General
In general, we have two specs: Spec1 with variables x 1, . . . , xm , y1, . . . , yn ,
and Spec2 with variables x 1, . . . , xm , z 1, . . . , zp . For compactness let x denote
x 1, . . . , xm , let y denote y1, . . . , yn and let z denote z 1, . . . , zp . We consider x
to be the externally visible variables of both specifications, and we consider y
and z to be internal variables.
The specifications with their internal variables hidden are written ∃ y : Spec1
and ∃ z : Spec2 . To verify that ∃ y : Spec1 implements ∃ z : Spec2 , we must show
that for each behavior satisfying Spec1, there is some way to assign values of the
variables z in each state so that the resulting behavior satisfies Spec2. We do
that by explicitly specifying those values of z in terms of the values of x and y.
More precisely, for each z i we define an expression zi in terms of the variables
x and y and show that Spec1 implements [[Spec2]], the specification obtained by
expanding all definitions in Spec2 and substituting z 1 ← z 1, . . . , zp ← zp in
the resulting formula. This substitution is called a refinement mapping; and if
Spec1 implements [[Spec2]], then we say that Spec1 implements Spec2 under the
refinement mapping.
The assertion that Spec1 implements Spec2 under the refinement mapping
z 1 ← z 1, . . . , zp ← zp can be expressed in TLA
+ as follows. Suppose Spec1 is
formula Spec1 in a module namedMod1, and Spec2 is formula Spec2 in a module
named Mod2. (Spec1 and Spec2 can be the same identifier.) For some identifier
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Id , we add the following statement to Mod1:3
Id
∆
= instance Mod2 with z 1 ← z 1, . . . , zp ← zp
The assertion that Spec1 implements Spec2 under the refinement mapping can
then be expressed in module Mod1 by the following theorem:
theorem Spec1⇒ Id !Spec2
This theorem asserts that in any behavior satisfying Spec1, the values of the
expressions z i are values that Spec2 permits the variables z i to have. The shape
of the theorem makes it explicit that in TLA+, implementation is implication.
The correctness of the theorem can be checked (but seldom completely verified)
with TLC for module Mod1 having Spec1 as the specification and Id !Spec2 as
the temporal property to be checked.
As we will see, it is sometimes the case that ∃ y : Spec1 implements ∃ z : Spec2
but there does not exist a refinement mapping under which Spec1 implements
Spec2. In that case, it is almost always possible to construct the necessary
refinement mapping by adding auxiliary variables to Spec1. Adding auxiliary
variables a to the specification Spec1 means finding a specification Spec
a
1 such
that ∃ a : Speca1 is equivalent to Spec1. Showing that ∃ y, a : Spec
a
1 implements
∃ z : Spec2 shows that ∃ y : Spec1 implements ∃ z : Spec2 , since ∃ y, a : Spec
a
1
equals ∃ y : ∃ a : Speca1 which is equivalent to ∃ y : Spec1 . Even though we can’t
define the expressions zi in terms of x and y, we may be able to define them in
terms of x, y, and a.
We will define three kinds of auxiliary variables: history variables that re-
member what happened in the past, prophecy variables that predict what will
happen in the future, and stuttering variables that add stuttering steps (ones
that don’t change x and y).
3 History Variables
3.1 Equivalence of MinMax1 and MinMax2
Let us return to the notation of Section 2.4, so Spec1 is specification Spec of
module MinMax1 and Spec2 is specification Spec of module MinMax2. We
observed that ∃ y : Spec1 and ∃ min,max : Spec2 are equivalent, meaning that
each implements (implies) the other. We found a refinement mapping under
which Spec1 implements Spec2. To prove the converse implication, we want to
find a refinement mapping under which Spec2 implements Spec1. This means
defining an expression y in terms of the variables x , turn, min, and max such
3If Mod2 has declared constants, then the statement must also specify expressions to be
substituted for those constants. A substitution of the form id ← id for an identifier id can be
omitted from the with clause.
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that the values of x , turn, and y in any behavior allowed by Spec1 are values of
x , turn, and y allowed by Spec2.
In a behavior of Spec1, the value of y is the set of all values input by the
user. However, in a behavior of Spec2, the variables min and max record only
the smallest and largest input values. There is no way to reconstruct the set
of all values input from the variables of MinMax2. So, there is no refinement
mapping under which Spec2 implements Spec1. To solve this problem, we write
another spec Spech2 that is the same as Spec2, except that it also constrains the
behavior of another variable h. More precisely, if we hide h in Spech2 , then we
get a specification that’s equivalent to Spec2. Expressed mathematically, this
means ∃ h : Spech2 is equivalent to Spec2.
The initial predicate and next-state action of Spech2 are the same as those of
Spec2, except they also describe the values that h may assume. In particular,
the value of h records information about previous values of the variable x , but
does not affect the current or future values of x or any of the other variables
turn, min, and max of Spec2. Thus ∃ h : Spec
h
2 is equivalent to Spec2. We call
h a history variable.
We write Spech2 as follows in a TLA
+ module MinMax2H . The module
begins with the statement
extends MinMax2
that simply imports all the declarations and definitions from MinMax , defining
Spec to be the specification we are calling Spec2. The module declares the
variable h and defines the initial predicate InitH of Spech2 by
InitH
∆
= Init ∧ (h = { })
The next-state action NextH is defined to equal InputNumH ∨RespondH where
InputNumH and RespondH are defined as follows:
InputNumH
∆
= ∧ InputNum
∧ h′ = h
RespondH
∆
= ∧ Respond
∧ h′ = h ∪ {x}
The specification Spech2 is the following formula defined in the module:
SpecH
∆
= InitH ∧ ✷[NextH ]varsH
where varsH equals 〈vars , h 〉. (Because vars equals 〈x , turn,min,max 〉, we
can also define varsH to equal 〈x , turn,min,max , h 〉; the two definitions give
equivalent expressions unchanged varsH .)
It’s easy to see that this specification asserts that h is always equal to the set
of all values that the user has input thus far, which is exactly what Spec1 asserts
about y. Therefore, Spech2 implements Spec1 under the refinement mapping 14
module MinMax2H
extends MinMax2
variable h
varsH
∆
= 〈vars , h〉
InitH
∆
= Init ∧ (h = {})
InputNumH
∆
= ∧ InputNum
∧ h′ = h
RespondH
∆
= ∧ Respond
∧ h′ = h ∪ {x}
NextH
∆
= InputNumH ∨ RespondH
SpecH
∆
= InitH ∧ ✷[NextH ]varsH
M
∆
= instance MinMax1 with y ← h
theorem SpecH ⇒ M !Spec
Figure 4: Module MinMax2H.
y ← h—that is, with y equal to the expression h. We express this in module
MinMax2H by
M
∆
= instance MinMax1 with y ← h
theorem SpecH ⇒ M !Spec
The complete module MinMax2H is in Figure 4
3.2 Disjunctive Representation
The generalization from the MinMax example is intuitively clear. We add a
history variable h to a specification by conjoining h = expInit to its initial
predicate and (h′ = expA) to each subaction A of its next-state action, where
expression expInit can contain the spec’s variables and each expression expA can
contain the spec’s variables, both primed and unprimed, and h (unprimed). To
make this precise, we have to state exactly what a subaction is.
In general, there may be many different ways to define the subactions of a
next-state action. In defining SpecH in module MinMax2H , we took InputNum
and Respond to be the subactions of the next-state action Next of MinMax2.
However, we can also consider Next itself to be a subaction of Next . We can do
this and get an equivalent specification SpecH by defining NextH as follows:
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NextH
∆
= ∧ Next
∧ ∨ (turn = “input”) ∧ (h′ = h)
∨ (turn = “output”) ∧ (h′ = h ∪ {x})
The two specifications are equivalent because the two definitions of NextH are
equivalent. Their equivalence is asserted by adding the following theorem to
module MinMax2H . The TLAPS proof system easily checks its by proof.
theorem NextH = ∧ InputNum ∨ Respond
∧ ∨ (turn = “input”) ∧ (h′ = h)
∨ (turn = “output”) ∧ (h′ = h ∪ {x})
by def NextH , Next , InputNumH , RespondH , InputNum, Respond
To define what a subaction is, we introduce the concept of a disjunctive repre-
sentation. A disjunctive representation of a formula N is a way of writing N in
terms of subactions A1, . . . , Am using only the operators ∨ and ∃k ∈ K , for
some identifiers k and expressions K . For example, consider the formula:
B ∨ C ∨ D ∨ (∃i ∈ S , j ∈ T :
(∃q ∈ U : E ) ∨ (∃r ∈ W : F ))
(3.1)
where B , C , D , E , and F can be any formulas. Here is one of the 36 possi-
ble disjunctive representations of formula (3.1), where each boxed formula is a
subaction:
B ∨ C ∨ D ∨ (∃i ∈ S , j ∈ T :
(∃q ∈ U : E ) ∨ (∃r ∈ W : F ))
In other words, this disjunctive representation of (3.1) has the four subactions
B , C ∨D , ∃q ∈ U : E , and F .
Each subaction of a disjunction representation has a context, which is a pair
〈k;K〉, where k is an n-tuple of identifiers and K is an n-tuple of expressions,
for some n. The contexts of the subactions in the disjunctive representation of
(3.1) defined above are:
subaction context
B 〈 〉
C ∨D 〈 〉
∃q ∈ U : E 〈i , j ; S ,T 〉
F 〈i , j , r ; S ,T ,W 〉
We let ∃〈i , j ; S ,T 〉 be an abbreviation for ∃i ∈ S , j ∈ T and similarly for
∀〈i , j ; S ,T 〉.
The generalization of this example should be clear. The tuple of identifiers in
the context of a subaction A are all the bound identifiers of existential quantifiers
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within whose scope A lies.4 If 〈k;K〉 is the empty context 〈; 〉, we let ∃〈k;K〉 : F
and ∀〈k;K〉 :F equal F .
We can now define precisely what it means to add a history variable to a
specification The definition is contained in the hypothesis of this theorem:
Theorem 1 (History Variable) Let Spec equal Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars and let
Spech equal Inith ∧ ✷[Nexth ]varsh , where:
• Inith equals Init ∧ (h = expInit ), for some expression expInit that may
contain the specification’s (unprimed) variables.
• Nexth is obtained from Next by replacing each subaction A of a disjunctive
representation of Next with A ∧ (h′ = expA) , for some expression expA
that may contain primed and unprimed specification variables, identifiers
in the context of A, and constant parameters.
• varsh equals 〈vars , h 〉
Then Spec is equivalent to ∃ h : Spech .
The hypotheses of this theorem are purely syntactic ones: conditions on the
definitions of Inith , Nexth , and varsh plus conditions on what variables and
identifiers may appear in expInit and expA. By a variable or identifier appearing
in an expression exp, we mean that it appears in the expression [[exp]] obtained
by expanding all definitions if exp. (See the discussion of definition expansion
on page 7.)
3.3 Equivalence of Next-State Actions
When adding an auxiliary variable, it is often useful to rewrite a specification
Spec—that is, to replace Spec with a different but equivalent formula. This is
most often done by rewriting the next-state action Next , which is done by rewrit-
ing one or more of the subactions in a disjunctive representation of Next . We
now consider when we can replace a subaction A in a disjunctive representation
of Next by the subaction B .
We can obviously replace A by B if A and B are equivalent formulas. How-
ever, this is often too stringent a requirement. For example, the two actions
(x ′ = if y ≥ 0 then x + y else x − y) ∧ (y ′ = y)
(x ′ = if y > 0 then x + y else x − y) ∧ (y ′ = y)
are not equivalent. However, they are equivalent if y is a number. Thus, we can
replace one by the other in the next-state action if y ∈ Int is an invariant of the
specification. The generalization of this observation is:
4Everything we do extends easily to handle unbounded quantification if we pretend that the
unbounded quantifiers ∃v and ∀v are written ∃v ∈ Ω and ∀v ∈ Ω, and we define e ∈ Ω to equal
true for every expression e. Since unbounded quantification seldom occurs in specifications,
we will not discuss this further. 17
Theorem 2 (Subaction Equivalence) Let A be a subaction with context
〈k;K〉 in a disjunctive representation of the next-state action of a specification
Spec with tuple vars of variables, let Inv be an invariant of Spec, and let B be
an action satisfying:
Inv ⇒ ∀〈k;K〉 :A ≡ B(3.2)
Then Spec is equivalent to the specification obtained by replacing A with B in
the next-state action’s disjunctive representation.
Formula (3.2) is an action formula, so it can be proved with TLAPS but cannot
be checked with TLC.
TLC can check directly that two specifications are equivalent by checking
that each specification implies the other. To check that specification Spec implies
a specification SpecB , just run TLC with a model having Spec as the behavioral
specification and SpecB as the property to be checked. If one spec is obtained
by a simple modification of the other, it should suffice to use small models. But
in that case, it should not be hard to prove (3.2) with TLAPS, where Inv is a
simple type invariant.
3.4 Discussion of History Variables
As our example, we showed that specifications MinMax1 and MinMax2 are
equivalent. In practice, we rarely care about checking equivalence of specifi-
cations. We almost always want to show that a specification S satisfies some
property P , which means that S implies P . For example, S ⇒ ✷Inv asserts
that Inv is an invariant of S. In (2.6) and (2.7), the property P is, like S, a
complete system specification.
The most general form of correctness that TLC can check is that one speci-
fication implies another. For example, the assertion that Inv is an invariant of
a specification S with tuple vars of variables is equivalent to the assertion that
S implies the specification
Inv ∧ ✷[Inv ′ ≡ Inv ]vars
We often want to show that a specification S implies a higher-level, more ab-
stract specification T . The standard way of doing this is to find a refinement
mapping that expresses the values of T ’s variables as functions of the values
of S’s variables. This can’t be done if specification T remembers in its state
information that is forgotten by S. In that case, we show that S implies T by
adding a history variable h to S to obtain the specification Sh , and we find a
refinement mapping to show Sh implies T . Since ∃ h : Sh is equivalent to S,
this shows that S implies T .
One can argue that T is not a good higher-level specification if it keeps in-
formation about the past that doesn’t have to be kept by its implementation S.
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However, sometimes that information about the past can simplify the higher-
level specification. We may also add a history variable to a specification S so
we can state the property we want to show that it satisfies, even if we aren’t
explicitly constructing a refinement mapping. For example the property that S
requires one kind of action to occur before another can be expressed as an in-
variant if we add a history variable that remembers when actions have occurred.
Because it’s a history variable, it doesn’t have to be implemented in the system
being specified—that is, in the actual hardware or software. Only the variables
of S must be implemented.
3.5 Liveness
A natural liveness requirement for our MinMax specs is that every input should
produce an output. This requirement is added to both specifications by conjoin-
ing the fairness requirement WFvars(Respond) to the formula Spec. (It is just a
peculiarity of our example that the fairness requirements are exactly the same
in both specifications.) Let us call the resulting specifications LSpec.
The two specifications are still equivalent when the internal variables are
hidden. Formula (2.5), and hence formulas (2.6) and (2.7), remain true if we
replace Spec1 and Spec2 by LSpec1 and LSpec2, respectively—where LSpec1 and
LSpec2 are formulas LSpec of MinMax1 and MinMax2, respectively. We verify
(2.6) the same as before by verifying the theorem LSpec ⇒ M !LSpec of module
MinMax1. To verify (2.7), we need to add a history variable h to LSpec2 rather
than to Spec2. We now drop the subscripts; all the formulas we write will be
ones defined in MinMax2 or MinMax2H .
To add a history variable to the specification LSpec, we add a history variable
to its safety part and then conjoin the liveness part of LSpec. The resulting
specification is defined in module MinMax2H by
HLSpec
∆
= HSpec ∧WFvars(Respond)
The equivalence of LSpec and ∃ h :HLSpec follows from the equivalence of Spec
and ∃ h :HSpec by this argument:
1. Spec ∧WFvars(Respond) ≡ (∃ h :HSpec ) ∧WFvars(Respond)
Proof: Because Spec is equivalent to ∃ h :HSpec .
2. (∃ h :HSpec ) ∧ WFvars(Respond)
≡ ∃ h : (HSpec ∧WFvars(Respond))
Proof: For any formulas F and G, if h does not occur in G, then
(∃ h :F ) ∧G is equivalent to ∃ h : (F ∧G) .
3. Q.E.D.
Proof: By definition of LSpec and HLSpec, 1 and 2 imply that LSpec
is equivalent to ∃ h :HLSpec . 19
What we have done for this example generalizes in the obvious way. For a
specification written in the canonical form
Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars ∧ L
with L a liveness condition, we add a history variable by adding it just to the
safety part, keeping the same liveness condition. This method of adding a history
variable to a specification with liveness produces unusual specifications. In our
example, if we expand the definition of HSpec, we see that specification HLSpec
equals
InitH ∧ ✷[NextH ]varsH ∧ WFvars(Respond)
This spec is unusual because it contains a fairness condition on the action
Respond that is not a subaction of the next-state relation NextH . Such specs can
be weird. However, specs obtained in this way by adding a history variable are
not. Because (i) a Respond action is enabled iff a RespondH action is and (ii) a
NextH step is a Respond step iff it is a RespondH step, specification HLSpec is
equivalent to the normal specification:
InitH ∧ ✷[NextH ]varsH ∧ WFvarsH (RespondH )(3.3)
In general, if Spech is obtained from a specification Spec by adding a history
variable h, then replacing a fairness requirement on a subaction A by the same
fairness requirement on Ah produces a specification equivalent to Spech .
The unusual nature of specification HLSpec affects neither the TLC model
checker nor our ability to reason about the specification. The same refinement
mapping as before shows that HLSpec implements MinMax1 with the added
fairness condition when internal variables are hidden.
4 Prophecy Variables
As we have observed, the fundamental task of verification is to show that the
specification Spec1 of an implementation satisfies a specification Spec2 of what
the implementation is supposed to do. A history variable remembers the past.
It is needed to find a refinement mapping to show that Spec1 implements Spec2
when Spec2 remembers previous events longer than it has to. A prophecy vari-
able is one that predicts the future. It is needed to find a refinement mapping
to show that Spec1 implements Spec2 when Spec2 makes decisions before it has
to.
4.1 One-Prediction Prophecy Variables
We begin by showing how to add a simple prophecy variable that makes a single
prediction at a time. Suppose a disjunctive representation of the next-state
relation contains a subaction A such that
A⇒ (∃i ∈ Π : PredA(i) )(4.1) 20
for some expression PredA(i) and constant set Π. Formula (4.1) is equivalent to
A ≡ A ∧ (∃i ∈ Π :PredA(i) )(4.2)
which means that any A step is an A ∧ PredA(i) step for some i in Π. We
introduce a one-prediction prophecy variable p whose value is an i for which the
next A step is an A ∧ PredA(i) step—if there is a next A step. (There could
be more than one such i , since we don’t require PredA(i) ∧ PredA(j ) to equal
false if i 6= j .) We give p that meaning by replacing the subaction A with a
subaction Ap defined by
Ap
∆
= A ∧ PredA(p) ∧ Setp(4.3)
where Setp determines the value of p′.
To ensure that adding the prophecy variable p allows all the behaviors of the
other variables that the original spec does, we must ensure that p can always
have any value in Π. We do this by initializing p to an arbitrary element of
Π and changing p only by setting it to any arbitrary element of Π. Thus we
modify the spec’s initial predicate Init to equal Init ∧ (p ∈ Π) and we let Setp
equal p′ ∈ Π, so
Ap
∆
= A ∧ PredA(p) ∧ (p
′ ∈ Π)(4.4)
For another subaction A of the next-state relation whose effect is not being
predicted by p, we let Ap leave the prediction unchanged, so it is defined simply
as:
Ap
∆
= A ∧ (p′ = p)(4.5)
We illustrate this with a simple example: a system in which integers are sent
and received, where sending an integer i is represented by setting the variable
x to i , and receiving a value is represented by setting x to a value NotInt that
is not an integer. Our specification SendInt2 has the receiving action set an
internal variable z to the next value to be sent. (The initial value of z is the
first value to be sent.) This simple specification is in Figure 5.
Of course, we can describe the behavior of the variable x even more simply,
without using any internal variable. Such a specification is in module SendInt1
of Figure 6. Let Spec1 and Spec2 be the formulas Spec of modules SendInt1
and SendInt2, respectively. It should be obvious that Spec1 is equivalent to
∃ z : Spec2 . To verify (∃ z : Spec2)⇒ Spec1 , we just have to verify Spec2 ⇒
Spec1, which TLC easily checks for a model that substitutes a finite set of
integers for Int . We now show how to verify Spec1 ⇒ (∃ z : Spec2) .
There is obviously no refinement mapping under which Spec1 implements
Spec2. Such a refinement mapping would be an expression z involving only the
variable x so that z is the value of z in any state satisfying Spec2. This is 21
module SendInt2
extends Integers
NotInt
∆
= choose n : n /∈ Int
variable x , z
Init
∆
= ∧ x = NotInt
∧ z ∈ Int
Send
∆
= ∧ x = NotInt
∧ x ′ = z
∧ z ′ = NotInt
Rcv
∆
= ∧ x ∈ Int
∧ x ′ = NotInt
∧ z ′ ∈ Int
Next
∆
= Send ∨ Rcv
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]〈x , z〉
Figure 5: Specification SendInt2.
module SendInt1
extends Integers
NotInt
∆
= choose n : n /∈ Int
variable x
Init
∆
= x = NotInt
Send
∆
= ∧ x = NotInt
∧ x ′ ∈ Int
Rcv
∆
= ∧ x ∈ Int
∧ x ′ = NotInt
Next
∆
= Send ∨ Rcv
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]x
Figure 6: Specification SendInt1
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impossible, since z could equal any integer in a state in which x equals NotInt ,
so there is no way to express its value as a function of the value of x . The
variable z of SendInt2 is used to predict the value to be sent before it actually
is sent. To be able to define the value of z for a refinement mapping, we add a
prophecy variable p to SendInt1 that predicts what the next value to be sent is.
The prophecy variable p must predict the value sent by action Send of
SendInt1. Therefore SendP must have the form of (4.4). A little thought shows
that p makes the right prediction if we take PredSend (p) to equal x
′ = p. Since
TLA+ doesn’t allow identifiers to have subscripts we write PredSend instead of
PredSend and define
PredSend(i)
∆
= x ′ = i
Condition (4.1) becomes
Send ⇒ ∃i ∈ Π :PredSend(i)
which is obviously true by definition of Send , if we let Π equal Int . Writing Pi
instead of Π and SendP instead of Sendp , we make the definitions:
Pi
∆
= Int
SendP
∆
= Send ∧ PredSend(p) ∧ (p′ ∈ Pi)
(We could of course simply write Int instead of Pi , but writing Pi will help us
understand what’s going on.)
For the receive action, Rcvp should have the form (4.5).
In a behavior of SendInt2, when x equals NotInt , the value of z is the
next value sent; and when x equals an integer (the value sent), then z equals
NotInt . Therefore, if SpecP is the specification obtained from specification Spec
of SendInt1 by adding the prophecy variable p, then SpecP implements the
specification Spec of SendInt2 under this refinement mapping:
z ← if x = NotInt then p else NotInt
Note that SpecP predicts the next value to be sent even before the SendInt2 spec-
ification does—when the previous value is sent rather than when it is received.
Although it’s not necessary, we’ll see later how we could defer the prediction
until the Rcv action is executed.
The complete specification is contained in module SendInt1P in Figure 7.
Observe that we defined PredSend before the declaration of p to ensure that
PredSend is not defined in terms of p.
The module’s theorem asserts that SpecP implements formula Spec of
SendInt2 under the refinement mapping defined above. It can be checked with
TLC by creating a model with temporal specification SpecP and having it check
the temporal property SI 2!Spec. The model will have to substitute a finite set
of integers for Int . The specification is very simple and doesn’t depend on any
properties of integers, so substituting a set with a few numbers will ensure that
we didn’t make a mistake. 23
module SendInt1P
extends SendInt1
Pi
∆
= Int
PredSend(i)
∆
= x ′ = i
variable p
varsP
∆
= 〈x , p〉
InitP
∆
= Init ∧ (p ∈ Pi)
SendP
∆
= Send ∧ PredSend(p) ∧ (p′ ∈ Pi)
RcvP
∆
= Rcv ∧ (p′ = p)
NextP
∆
= SendP ∨ RcvP
SpecP
∆
= InitP ∧ ✷[NextP ]varsP
SI 2
∆
= instance SendInt2 with z ← if x = NotInt then p else NotInt
theorem SpecP ⇒ SI 2 !Spec
Figure 7: Specification SendInt1P
4.2 One-Prediction Prophecy Variables in General
We generalize our description of a one-prediction prophecy variable in two ways.
First, we can allow a prophecy variable to make predictions about more than one
action by replacing more than one subaction A of a disjunctive representation
by an action Ap of the form (4.3). If we do this for subactions A1, A2, . . . , then
the value of p makes a prediction about the next step to occur that is an A1 or
A2 or . . . step. We can express this a little more elegantly by generalizing (4.3)
to allow Setp to depend on A and then letting each action A of the disjunctive
representation be replaced with an action Ap defined by
Ap
∆
= A ∧ PredA(p) ∧ SetpA(4.6)
For an action A about which no prediction is being made, PredA(p) is the
expression true. We can then replace (4.4) and (4.5) by defining SetpA to be
one of the following:
(a) SetpA
∆
= p′ = p
(b) SetpA
∆
= p′ ∈ Π
(4.7)
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where possibility (a) is allowed only if PredA(p) is the expression true (so p is
making no prediction about A). This is more general because it allows an action
that doesn’t use the prediction made by p to make a new prediction.
Our second generalization is needed to handle subactions of a disjunctive
representation having a nonempty context. For a subaction A with context
〈k;K〉, condition (4.1) contains the identifiers k. That condition need only hold
for values of those identifiers in the corresponding set in K. Thus (4.1) can be
generalized to
∀〈k;K〉 :A⇒ (∃i ∈ Π : PredA(i))(4.8)
Condition (4.8) is a condition on pairs of states. It needn’t hold for all pairs of
states, only for pairs of states that can occur in a behavior satisfying the original
specification Spec. We can therefore replace (4.8) by the requirement5
Spec ⇒ ✷[ ∀〈k;K〉 :A⇒ (∃i ∈ Π : PredA(i) )]vars(4.9)
TLC can check this condition with a model having the temporal formula Spec
as its behavioral spec and
✷[∀〈k;K〉 :A⇒ (∃i ∈ Π :PredA(i) )]vars
as a property to be checked.
4.3 Prophecy Array Variables
Our next example is based on one created by Mart´ın Abadi [1]. It is similar
to our SendInt specifications in that a sender sends a value v to a receiver
with a Send action that sets the variable x to v , and the receiver receives the
value by resetting x . Instead of sending integers, the values sent are elements
of an unspecified constant set Data, and we let the initial value of x be a value
NonData not in Data. A variable y contains a set of values to be sent. Those
values are chosen by a Choose action, which adds a new data element to y.
The high-level specification is formula Spec in module SendSet of Figure 8. We
consider the variable x to be externally visible and y to be internal.
Our implementation adds to the specification of SendSet an undo operation
that removes elements from y. Abadi reports that this example is a highly
simplified abstraction of a real system in which the implementation contains an
undo operation not present in the specification.
The implementation specification is formula SpecU in module SendSetUndo
of Figure 9. Its initial predicate is the same as the initial predicate of the
specification Spec of module SendSet , and its next-state action NextU is the
same as the next-state action Next of that module except it allows Undo(S )
steps that remove from y an arbitrarily chosen non-empty subset S of y.
5Formula (4.9) does not imply that (4.8) is true for stuttering steps that are allowed by A.
It can be shown that this doesn’t matter, and condition (4.9) is strong enough. 25
module SendSet
constant Data
NonData
∆
= choose d : d /∈ Data
variables x , y
vars
∆
= 〈x , y〉
Init
∆
= (x = NonData) ∧ (y = {})
Choose
∆
= ∧ ∃ d ∈ Data \ y : y ′ = y ∪ {d}
∧ x ′ = x
Send
∆
= ∧ x = NonData
∧ x ′ ∈ y
∧ y ′ = y \ {x ′}
Rcv
∆
= ∧ x ∈ Data
∧ x ′ = NonData
∧ y ′ = y
Next
∆
= Choose ∨ Send ∨ Rcv
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Figure 8: Specification SendSet.
module SendSetUndo
extends SendSet
Undo(S )
∆
= ∧ y ′ = y \ S
∧ x ′ = x
NextU
∆
= Next ∨ (∃S ∈ (subset y) : Undo(S ))
SpecU
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[NextU ]vars
Figure 9: Specification SendSetUndo.
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It’s clear that the specifications Spec of module SendSet and SpecU of module
SendSetUndo allow the same behaviors of the variable x . Hence, ∃ y : Spec
and ∃ y : SpecU are equivalent. It’s easy to show that Spec implements SpecU
under the identity refinement mapping in which y is defined to equal y, since
NextU allows all steps allowed by Next . This implies that ∃ y : Spec implies
∃ y : SpecU . To construct a refinement mapping under which SpecU implements
Spec, we must define y so that it contains a data value d iff that value is going
to be sent by a Send step rather than being removed from y by an Undo step.
This involves predicting, when d is added to y, whether it will later be sent or
“undone”.
We add a prophecy array variable p to SpecU that makes this prediction,
setting p[d ] to either “send” or “undo” when d is added to y. So, we define our
set Pi of possible predictions by
Pi
∆
= {“send”, “undo”}
The value of p in every state will be a function with domain equal to the set y,
with p[d ] ∈ Pi for all d ∈ y. In other words p ∈ [y → Pi ] will be an invariant
of the spec SpecUP obtained by adding the prophecy variable p. The variable p
is therefore making a predication p[d ] for every d in y, so p is making an array
of prophecies. (This is a “dynamic” array, because the value of y can change.)
We now define the specification SpecUP . As with a one-prediction prophecy
variable, we obtain the next-state relation of SpecUP by replacing each subaction
A in a disjunctive representation of the next-state relation with a new action
Ap . Instead of defining Ap as in (4.6), we define it to equal
Ap
∆
= A ∧ PredA(p) ∧ (p
′ ∈ NewPSetA)(4.10)
for suitable expressions PredA(p) and NewPSetA. We need a condition corre-
sponding to condition (4.9) for a one-prediction prophecy variable to assert that
there is a possible value of p that makes PredA(p) true. With an array prophecy
variable, p is no longer an element of Pi but a function in [Dom → Pi ] for some
domain Dom that can change. In our example, Dom equals y. To make the
generalization to an arbitrary spec easier, we define Dom to equal y and write
Dom instead of y where appropriate. For our example, we can replace (4.9) with
SpecU ⇒ ✷[∀〈k;K〉 : A⇒ (∃f ∈ [Dom → Π] :PredA(f ) )]vars(4.11)
where 〈k;K〉 is the context of A. (Remember that for the empty context 〈 ; 〉,
we define ∀〈 ; 〉 :F to equal F , for any formula F .)
We now define the formulas PredA and NewPSetA for the disjunctive repre-
sentation of NextU with subactions Choose, Send , Rcv , and Undo(S ). The
context of the first three subactions is empty; the context of Undo(S ) is
〈S ; subset y 〉.
The variable p does not make any prediction about the Choose action, so
PredChoose(p) should equal true. The action adds an element d to its domain, 27
so Choosep must allow p′[d ] to equal any element of Pi . For any element d in
the domain Dom of p, the value of p[d ] can be left unchanged. Our definitions
of PredChoose(p) and NewPSetChoose(p) are then
PredChoose(p)
∆
= true
NewPSetChoose(p)
∆
= { f ∈ [Dom ′ → Pi ] : ∀ d ∈ Dom : f [d ] = p[d ] }
The prophecy variable p should predict that if the next action is a Send action,
then it sends a value d in Dom such that p[d ] = “send”. The value sent by the
action is x ′, so we define
PredSend(p)
∆
= p[x ′] = “send”
The Send action removes the sent element d from Dom, thus erasing the predic-
tion p made about d . The value of p[d ] is left unchanged for all other elements
d in Dom. Thus NewPSetSend (p) is defined as follows to be a set consisting of
a single function
NewPSetSend(p)
∆
= { [d ∈ Dom ′ 7→ p[d ]] }
No prediction is made about the Rcv action, and it doesn’t change Dom, so we
have:
PredRcv(p)
∆
= true
NewPSetRcv(p)
∆
= {p}
The Undo(S )p action should be enabled only when p has predicted that all the
elements in S will not be sent—in other words, when ∀d ∈ S : p[d ] = “undo” is
true. Since the identifier S appears in this formula, it must be an argument of
the definition of Undo(S )p . Thus, we define
PredUndo(p, S )
∆
= ∀d ∈ S : p[d ] = “undo”
The Undo(S ) action removes from Dom all the elements for which p made
a prediction about Undo(S )—namely, all the elements of S . We can define
NewPSetUndo(S) the same way we defined PSetSendSend , without explicitly men-
tioning S :
NewPSetUndo(p)
∆
= { [d ∈ Dom ′ 7→ p[d ]] }
We can now declare the variable p and define the specification SpecUP by defin-
ing the initial predicate InitUP and defining the next-state relation NextUP in
terms of the subactions Ap , using (4.10). The complete specification is in mod-
ule SendSetUndoP shown in Figure 10. Note that the initial value of p is the
unique function whose domain is the empty set. We could write that function
as [d ∈ {} 7→ exp] for any expression exp—for example, 42. However, it’s easier
to write that function as 〈 〉 (the empty sequence).
We can now define the refinement mapping under which SpecUP implements
specification Spec of module SendSet . The refinement mapping defines y to
equal the set of elements d in y with p[d ] = “send”. We thus add to the module 28
module SendSetUndoP
extends SendSetUndo
Pi
∆
= {“send”, “undo”}
Dom
∆
= y
PredChoose(p)
∆
= true
NewPSetChoose(p)
∆
= {f ∈ [Dom ′ → Pi ] : ∀ d ∈ Dom : f [d ] = p[d ]}
PredSend(p)
∆
= p[x ′] = “send”
NewPSetSend(p)
∆
= {[d ∈ Dom ′ 7→ p[d ]]}
PredRcv(p)
∆
= true
NewPSetRcv(p)
∆
= {p}
PredUndo(p, S )
∆
= ∀ d ∈ S : p[d ] = “undo”
NewPSetUndo(p)
∆
= {[d ∈ Dom ′ 7→ p[d ]]}
variable p
varsP
∆
= 〈vars , p〉
InitUP
∆
= Init ∧ (p = 〈〉)
ChooseP
∆
= Choose ∧ PredChoose(p) ∧ (p′ ∈ NewPSetChoose(p))
SendP
∆
= Send ∧ PredSend(p) ∧ (p′ ∈ NewPSetSend(p))
RcvP
∆
= Rcv ∧ PredRcv(p) ∧ (p′ ∈ NewPSetRcv(p))
UndoP(S )
∆
= Undo(S ) ∧ PredUndo(p, S ) ∧ (p′ ∈ NewPSetUndo(p))
NextUP
∆
= ChooseP ∨ SendP ∨ RcvP ∨ (∃S ∈ subset y : UndoP(S ))
SpecUP
∆
= InitUP ∧ ✷[NextUP ]varsP
Figure 10: Specification SendSetUndoP
SS
∆
= instance SendSet with y ← {d ∈ y : p[d ] = “send”}
theorem SpecUP ⇒ SS !Spec
We can have TLC check this theorem by creating a model having SpecUP as
the behavior spec and checking the property SS !Spec.
We should also check that condition (4.11) holds for each subaction A. To
do this, we need to create a model with specification SpecU and have TLC check
the property:
✷[ ∧ Choose ⇒ ∃ f ∈ [Dom → Pi ] : PredChoose(f )
∧ Send ⇒ ∃ f ∈ [Dom → Pi ] : PredSend(f )
∧ Rcv ⇒ ∃ f ∈ [Dom → Pi ] : PredRcv(f ) 29
∧ ∀S ∈ subset y :
Undo(S )⇒ ∃ f ∈ [Dom → Pi ] : PredUndo(f , S )
]vars
However, there is a problem in doing this. TLC will not allow a model for module
SendSetUndoP to have behavior specification SpecU because that spec doesn’t
describe the behavior of the variable p. We can solve this problem by modifying
the specification—temporarily inserting “======” into the module before the
declaration of p and then creating the necessary model. Alternatively, we can
move all the definitions before the declaration of p into module SendSetUndo
and check the condition in a model for that spec. This is inelegant because those
definitions aren’t part of the SendSetUndo specification. The proper solution is
to move those definitions from SendSetUndoP and put them in a new module
that extends SendSetUndo and is extended by SendSetUndoP . We can then
check that the condition is satisfied using a model for that specification that
has behavior spec SpecU . We won’t bother doing this, instead putting them in
module SendSetUndoP .
Recall that in the SendInt example of Section 4.1, the one-prediction prophecy
variable we used predicted the next value to be sent when the previous value was
sent, while the specification SendInt2 didn’t choose the next value to be sent
until the previous value was received. We can use an array prophecy variable
to defer the prediction until it’s needed. We let the domain Dom of p initially
contain a single element—let’s take that element to be “on”. We let the Send
action set Dom to the empty set, and we let the Rcv action set Dom to {“on”}.
4.4 Prophecy Data Structure Variables
It is easy to generalize from the SendSet example to an arbitrary prophecy-
array variable. However, it is useful to generalize still further from an array to
an arbitrary data structure. These prophecy data structure variables are the
most general ones that we consider. We propose them as the standard way
of defining prophecy variables in TLA+, and we have created a module with
definitions that simplify adding these prophecy variables. Both single-prophecy
variables and prophecy array variables are easily expressed as special cases.
As our example of a prophecy data structure variable, we modify the speci-
fication SendSet , in which a set of items to be sent is chosen, to a specification
SendSeq in which a sequence of items is chosen. The value of the variable y is
changed from a set of data items to a sequence of data items. The next item to
be sent is the one at the head of y, and each value chosen is appended to the
tail of y. The specification is in module SendSeq, shown in Figure 11.
For our implementation, we add an undo action that removes an arbitrary
element from the sequence y. The specification is in module SendSeqUndo of
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module SendSeq
extends Sequences , Integers
constant Data
NonData
∆
= choose v : v /∈ Data
variables x , y
vars
∆
= 〈x , y〉
Init
∆
= (x = NonData) ∧ (y = 〈〉)
Choose
∆
= ∧ ∃ d ∈ Data : y ′ = Append(y, d)
∧ x ′ = x
Send
∆
= ∧ x = NonData ∧ y 6= 〈〉
∧ x ′ = Head(y)
∧ y ′ = Tail(y)
Rcv
∆
= ∧ x ∈ Data
∧ x ′ = NonData
∧ y ′ = y
Next
∆
= Choose ∨ Send ∨ Rcv
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Figure 11: Specification SendSeq
Figure 12. It defines RemoveEltFrom(i , seq) to be the sequence obtained from
a sequence seq by removing its ith element, assuming 1 ≤ i ≤ Len(seq).
As before, we want to show that specification SendU of module SendSeqUndo
implements ∃ y : Spec , where Spec is the specification of module SendSeq. Again,
we need to add a prophecy variable p that predicts whether each element
of y will be sent or “undone”. We do this by having p be an element of
Seq({“send”, “undo”}) that has the same length as y. The Choosep action should
append either “send” or “undo” to the tail of p, the Sendp action should remove
the head of p, and the Undo(i) action should remove the ith element of p.
As we did for the SendSet example, we write a module SendSeqUndoP that
extends SendSeqUndo. In it, we define the formulas PredA(p) of (4.10) for each
of the subactions Choose, Send , Rcv , and Undo(i). The definitions are:
PredChoose(p)
∆
= true
PredSend(p)
∆
= p[1] = “send”
PredRcv(p)
∆
= true
PredUndo(p, i)
∆
= p[i ] = “undo” 31
module SendSeqUndo
extends SendSeq
RemoveEltFrom(i , seq)
∆
= [j ∈ 1 . . (Len(seq) − 1) 7→ if j < i then seq[j ]
else seq[j + 1]]
Undo(i)
∆
= ∧ y ′ = RemoveEltFrom(i , y)
∧ x ′ = x
NextU
∆
= Next ∨ (∃ i ∈ 1 . . Len(y) : Undo(i))
SpecU
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[NextU ]vars
Figure 12: Specification SendSeqUndo
We now need to define the expression NewPSetA of (4.10) for each of these
subactions.
Since a sequence of length n is a function with domain 1 . . n, the value of
p is a function—just as in SendSetUndoP above. This time its domain Dom is
the set 1 . .Len(y). However, in that example, if d is in the domain Dom of p
in two successive states, then p[d ] represents the same prediction in both states.
This isn’t true in the current example. If s → t is a Send step and Len(p) > 1
in state s , then the prediction made by p[2] in state s is the prediction made by
p[1] in state t . If s → t is an Undo(i) step and j > i , the prediction made by
p[j ] in state s is the prediction made by p[j − 1] in state t .
In general, an action A defines a correspondence between some elements in
the domain Dom of p and elements in the domain Dom ′ of p′. For example, for
the Send action, each element i > 1 in Dom corresponds to the element i − 1 of
Dom ′. The formula p′ ∈ NewPSetA in (4.10) should ensure that if an element
d of Dom ′ either corresponds to an element c of Dom that makes a prediction
about A or else does not correspond to any element of Dom, then p′[d ] can
assume any value in Π; but if d corresponds to an element c of Dom that make
no prediction about A, then p′[d ] equals p[c]. Instead of defining the formulas
NewPSetA directly, we will define them in terms of the correspondence between
elements of Dom and Dom ′ made by A and the set of elements d in Dom for
which p[d ] makes a prediction about A.
To express formally a correspondence between elements of Dom and Dom ′,
we introduce the concept of a partial injection. A partial function from a set
U to a set V is a function from a subset of U to V . In other words, it is an
element of [D → V ] for some subset D of U . (Remember that U is a subset of
itself.) An injection is a function that maps different elements in its domain to
different values. In other words, a function f is an injection iff for all a and b in
domain f , if a 6= b then f [a] 6= f [b]. The set of all partial injections from U to
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V is defined in TLA+ by
PartialInjections(U , V )
∆
=
let PartialFcns
∆
= union {[D → V ] : D ∈ subset U }
in {f ∈ PartialFcns : ∀ a, b ∈ domain f : (a 6= b)⇒ (f [a] 6= f [b])}
For each subaction A, we define a partial injection DomInjA from Dom to Dom
′
such that an element c of Dom corresponds to an element d of Dom ′ iff c is in
the domain of DomInjA and d = DomInjA[c]. Here are the definitions for the
four subactions, which are put in module SendSeqUndoP :
DomInjChoose
∆
= [d ∈ Dom 7→ d ]
DomInjSend
∆
= [i ∈ 2 . . Len(y) 7→ i − 1]
DomInjRcv
∆
= [d ∈ Dom 7→ d ]
DomInjUndo(i)
∆
= [j ∈ 1 . . Len(y) \ {i} 7→ if j < i then j else j − 1]
For the prophecy array variable described in Section 4.3 above, the function
DomInjA maps each element d in Dom that is also in Dom
′ to itself. Thus, for
each subaction A used in defining a prophecy array variable, we can define
DomInjA
∆
= [d ∈ Dom ∩Dom ′ 7→ d ]
A function f such that f [x ] = x for all x ∈ domain f is called an identity func-
tion. For convenience, the Prophecy module defines IdFcn(S ) to be the identify
function with domain S . But we won’t bother using it here. The Prophecy
module also defines EmptyFcn to be the (unique) function whose domain is the
empty set.
Let us return to our prophecy data structure example. For a subaction A,
we can define NewPSetA in terms of DomInjA and the subset PredDomA of
Dom, which consists of the elements in Dom such that p[d ] makes a prediction
about A. We define these sets PredDomA in module SendSeqUndoP for our four
subactions as follows:
PredDomChoose
∆
= {}
PredDomSend
∆
= {1}
PredDomRcv
∆
= {}
PredDomUndo(i)
∆
= {i}
(Since PredDomUndo(i) depends on the identifier i in its context, we must define
PredDomUndo to have a parameter.)
We can define NewPSetA to equal the set of all functions q in [Dom
′ → Π]
such that for every element d in Dom that is not in PredDomA and has a cor-
responding element DomInjA[d ] in Dom
′, the value of q on that corresponding
element equals p[d ]. More precisely, NewPSetA equals:
{ q ∈ [Dom ′ → Π] :
∀d ∈ (domain DomInjA) \PredDomA : q[DomInjA[d ]] = p[d ] } 33
We encapsulate definitions like this in a module Prophecy. We find it most
convenient to make this a constant module with constant parameters Pi , Dom,
and DomPrime. This module is meant to be instantiated with the parameter
Pi instantiated by Π, with the parameter Dom instantiated by the appropriate
state function Dom, and with DomPrime instantiated by Dom ′. The follow-
ing definition from module Prophecy allows us to define NewPSetA(p) to equal
NewPSet(p,DomInjA,PredDomA) :
NewPSet(p, DomInj , PredDom)
∆
=
{ q ∈ [DomPrime → Pi ] :
∀ d ∈ (domain DomInj ) \PredDom : q[DomInj [d ]] = p[d ] }
For each action in A in our disjunctive decomposition of NextU , we have
written the definitions of PredA, DomInjA, and PredDomA. This allows us
to define NewPSetA, and therefore, by (4.10), to define A
p . The following
operator ProphAction from the Prophecy module allows us to write Ap as
ProphAction(A, p, p′,DomInjA,PredDomA,PredA) :
ProphAction(A, p, pPrime, DomInj , PredDom, Pred( ))
∆
=
A ∧ Pred(p) ∧ (pPrime ∈ NewPSet(p, DomInj , PredDom))
In module SendSeqUndoP , we can define
ChooseP
∆
= ProphAction(Choose, p, p′, DomInjChoose,
PredDomChoose, PredChoose)
The definitions of SendP and RcvP are similar. However, there is a problem with
the definition of Undo(i)p , which we write as UndoP(i). Operator ProphAction
requires its last argument, which represents PredA, to be an operator with a
single argument. However, we defined PredUndo to have two arguments: p and
its context identifier i . Since we are defining UndoP(i), the fifth argument has
to be an operator Op so that Op(p) equals PredUndo(p, i). So, we should define:
UndoP(i)
∆
= let Op(j )
∆
= PredUndo(j , i)
in ProphAction(Undo(i), p, p′, DomInjUndo(i),
PredDomUndo(i), Op)
Using the TLA+ lambda construct (added since Specifying Systems was pub-
lished), this can also be written as:
UndoP(i)
∆
=
ProphAction(Undo(i), p, p′, DomInjUndo(i), PredDomUndo(i),
lambda j : PredUndo(j , i) )
It’s now straightforward to complete our definition of specification SpecUP . Do-
ing so, gathering up the definitions made or implied so far, and rearranging them
a bit, we get the beginning of module SendSeqUndoP shown in Figure 13. 34
module SendSeqUndoP
extends SendSeqUndo
Pi
∆
= {“send”, “undo”}
Dom
∆
= domain y
instance Prophecy with DomPrime ← Dom ′
PredDomChoose
∆
= {}
DomInjChoose
∆
= [d ∈ Dom 7→ d ]
PredChoose(p)
∆
= true
PredDomSend
∆
= {1}
DomInjSend
∆
= [i ∈ 2 . . Len(y) 7→ i − 1]
PredSend(p)
∆
= p[1] = “send”
PredDomRcv
∆
= {}
DomInjRcv
∆
= [d ∈ Dom 7→ d ]
PredRcv(p)
∆
= true
PredDomUndo(i)
∆
= {i}
DomInjUndo(i)
∆
= [j ∈ 1 . . Len(y) \ {i} 7→ if j < i then j else j − 1]
PredUndo(p, i)
∆
= p[i ] = “undo”
variable p
varsP
∆
= 〈vars , p〉
InitUP
∆
= Init ∧ (p ∈ [Dom → Pi ])
ChooseP
∆
= ProphAction(Choose, p, p′,
DomInjChoose, PredDomChoose, PredChoose)
SendP
∆
= ProphAction(Send , p, p′, DomInjSend , PredDomSend , PredSend)
RcvP
∆
= ProphAction(Rcv , p, p′, DomInjRcv , PredDomRcv , PredRcv)
UndoP(i)
∆
= ProphAction(Undo(i), p, p′, DomInjUndo(i), PredDomUndo(i),
lambda j : PredUndo(j , i))
NextUP
∆
= ChooseP ∨ SendP ∨ RcvP ∨ (∃ i ∈ 1 . . Len(y) : UndoP(i))
SpecUP
∆
= InitUP ∧ ✷[NextUP ]varsP
Figure 13: The specification of SpecUP.
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Finally, we have to define the refinement mapping under which SpecUP im-
plements specification Spec of module SendSeq. The idea is simple: we let y be
the subsequence of y containing only those elements for which the corresponding
element of the sequence p equals “send”. The following formal definition is a bit
tricky. It uses a local recursive definition of an operator R such that if yseq is
any sequence and pseq is a sequence of the same length, then R(yseq, pseq) is
the subsequence of yseq that contains yseq[i ] iff pseq[i ] equals “send”.
yBar
∆
=
let recursive R( , )
R(yseq, pseq)
∆
=
if yseq = 〈 〉
then yseq
else if Head(pseq) = “send”
then 〈Head(yseq)〉 ◦ R(Tail(yseq), Tail(pseq))
else R(Tail(yseq), Tail(pseq))
in R(y, p)
We then instantiate module SendSeq and state as follows the theorem assert-
ing that SpecUP implements formula Spec of that model under the refinement
mapping.
SS
∆
= instance SendSeq with y ← yBar
theorem SpecUP ⇒ SS !Spec
TLC can check this theorem in the usual way.
4.5 Checking the Definitions
We have shown how to define a specification Specp for an arbitrary specification
Spec by defining a state function Dom and, for every subaction A of a disjunctive
representation of the next-state action of Spec, defining PredA, DomInjA, and
PredDomA. These definitions must satisfy certain conditions to ensure that
∃ p : Specp is equivalent to Spec. We now state those conditions.
The first condition is (4.11). The Prophecy module defines this operator:
ExistsGoodProphecy(Pred( ))
∆
= ∃ q ∈ [Dom → Pi ] : Pred(q)
For a subaction A with an empty context, we can write (4.11) as
Spec ⇒ ✷[A⇒ (ExistsGoodProphecy(PredA)]vars
(Remember that the Prophecy module will be instantiated with the appropriate
expression substituted for Dom.) To see how this definition is used if A has a
non-empty context, here is how condition is (4.11) is expressed for the subaction
UndoP(i) of specification SpecU in our SendSeq example: 36
SpecU ⇒ ✷[ ∀ i ∈ Dom :
Undo(i)⇒
ExistsGoodProphecy(lambda p : PredUndo(p, i)) ]vars
The only condition we require of DomInjA is that it be a partial function from
Dom to Dom ′. This is expressed as IsDomInj (DomInjA) using this definition
from module Prophecy
IsDomInj (DomInj )
∆
= DomInj ∈ PartialInjections(Dom, DomPrime)
As with the ExistsGoodProphecy condition, it needs to hold only for A steps in
a behavior satisfying the specification Spec. Hence the general requirement on
DomInjA for an action A with context 〈k;K〉 is
Spec ⇒ ✷[∀〈k;K〉 : A⇒ IsDomInj (DomInjA)]vars
Because IsDomInj does not have an operator argument, no local definition or
lambda expression is needed even if the context is nonempty. For example,
if A is subaction Undo(i) of specification SpecU of the SendSeq example, this
condition is written:
∀i ∈ Dom : Undo(i)⇒ IsDomInj (DomInjUndo(i))
Finally, we need a condition on PredDomA. Remember that PredDomA should
equal the set of elements d of Dom such that p[d ] is making predictions about A.
Actually, it suffices that PredDomA contain all such elements. (It may contain
other elements as well.) This is equivalent to the requirement that any element
not in PredDomA does not make a prediction about A. Making a prediction
about A means affecting the value of PredA, so not making a prediction means
not affecting its value. Thus, p[d ] does not make a prediction about A iff setting
p[d ] to any value in Π does not change the value of PredA. You should be able
to convince yourself that the value of PredA does not depend on the value of
p[d ] for any d not in PredDomA iff the following formula is true:
∀q, r ∈ [Dom → Pi ] :
(∀d ∈ PredDomA : q[d ] = r [d ])⇒ (PredA(q) = PredA(r))
In addition to this requirement, to ensure that our formulas make sense, we
also make the obvious requirement that PredDomA is a subset of Dom. The
following definition appears in module Prophecy.
IsPredDom(PredDom, Pred( ))
∆
=
∧ PredDom ⊆ Dom
∧ ∀ q, r ∈ [Dom → Pi ] :
(∀ d ∈ PredDom : q[d ] = r [d ])⇒ (Pred(q) = Pred(r))
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Condition
∆
=
∧ ProphCondition(Choose, DomInjChoose, PredDomChoose, PredChoose)
∧ ProphCondition(Send , DomInjSend , PredDomSend , PredSend)
∧ ProphCondition(Rcv , DomInjRcv , PredDomRcv , PredRcv)
∧ ∀ i ∈ Dom :
ProphCondition(Undo(i), DomInjUndo(i), PredDomUndo(i),
lambda p : PredUndo(p, i))
theorem SpecU ⇒ ✷[Condition]vars
Figure 14: Action requirements for specification SendSeqUndo.
Remembering that the condition on PredDomA needs to hold only for A steps
in a behavior satisfying the specification, we can express it for an action A with
an empty context as:
Spec ⇒ ✷[A⇒ IsPredDom(PredDomA,PredA)]vars
Because the second argument of IsPredDom is an operator argument, we again
need to use a local definition or a lambda expression to express the condi-
tion if the subaction A has a nonempty context. For example, here is how we
can express it for the Undo(i) subaction in our SendSeq example using a local
definition:
✷[ ∀ i ∈ Dom :
Undo(i) ⇒ let Op(p)
∆
= PredUndo(p, i)
in IsPredDom(PredDomUndo, Op) ]vars
Here is how it is written with a lambda expression:
✷[ ∀ i ∈ Dom :
Undo(i) ⇒ IsPredDom(PredDomUndo,
lambda p : PredUndo(p, i) ) ]vars
The following definition from module Prophecy allows us to combine the three
conditions.
ProphCondition(A, DomInj , PredDom, Pred( ))
∆
=
A ⇒ ∧ ExistsGoodProphecy(Pred)
∧ IsDomInj (DomInj )
∧ IsPredDom(PredDom, Pred)
Using this definition, the requirements on the definitions are expressed for spec-
ification SendSeqUndo in Figure 14.
We encounter the same problem here that we encountered in checking con-
dition (4.11) for the SendSet example. We would like to put these requirements 38
in module SendSetUndoP (Figure 10), right before the declaration of the vari-
able p. However, TLC can’t check the theorem in a model for that specification
because SpecU does not specify the values of variable p. We can either move
all the definitions that are now in SendSetUndoP before the declaration of p
into a separate module, put them at the end of module SendSetUndo, or end
the module before the declaration of p by adding “=====” when checking the
condition.
You should check these conditions when adding a prophecy variable. They
provide a good way to debug your definitions, before you try checking that the
specification with prophecy variable implements the desired specification.
4.6 Liveness
As with our other auxiliary variables, we add a prophecy variable to the safety
part of a specification, but we keep the liveness part the same. As we remarked in
Section 3.5, this produces unusual specifications in which the liveness property
can assert a fairness condition about an action that isn’t a subaction of the
next-state action.
For history variables, although the form of the specifications is unusual, the
specifications are not. This is not the case for prophecy variables. If Spec has a
liveness condition, the specification Specp obtained from it by adding a prophecy
variable can be weird. As an example, suppose that in the SendInt specifications
of Section 4.1, instead of taking Pi to equal Int , we let it equal Int ∪ {∞} for
some value ∞ /∈ Int . Everything we did would work exactly as before, and the
theorem at the end of module SendInt1P in Figure 7 would still be true. If a
SendP step set p′ to∞, predicting that the next value to be sent is ∞, then the
system would simply halt (stutter forever) before the next SendP step because
Send ∧ PredSend(∞) equals false.
Now suppose we add a liveness condition WFvars(Next) to our SendInt spec-
ifications, requiring that they never halt. We would then have
SpecP
∆
= InitP ∧ ✷[NextP ]varsP ∧WFvars(Next)
This formula SpecP implies that infinitely many Next steps must occur, so a
behavior can’t halt. The weak fairness conjunct therefore requires that SpecP
not set p′ to ∞. This is weird. The liveness property WFvars(Next) doesn’t
just require that something must eventually happen; it also prevents something
(setting p to ∞) from ever happening. The technical term for this weirdness is
that the formula SpecP is not machine closed [2], which means that its liveness
property affects safety as well as liveness.
Non-machine closed specs should never be used to describe how a system
works. You can’t understand how to implement a system if the next-state action
doesn’t describe what it can and cannot do next. In extremely rare cases, a non-
machine closed high-level spec is the best way to describe what a system should 39
do, rather than how it should do it. You are very unlikely to encounter such a
situation in practice.
While the non-machine closed spec we get by adding a prophecy variable to
a spec with liveness can be weird, this weirdness causes no problem. We don’t
have to implement SpecP . We use it only to check the correctness of Spec; and
the presence of the liveness property makes no difference in what we do. With
our modified SendInt specifications, we can check that SpecP implies SI 2!Spec
exactly as we did before.
5 Stuttering Variables
5.1 Adding Stuttering Steps to a Simple Action
Suppose Spec1 is a specification of a (24-hour) clock that displays only the
hour—a specification we can write as
Spec1
∆
= (h = 0) ∧ ✷[h′ = (h + 1)%24]h(5.1)
Let Spec2 be this specification of an hour-minute clock:
Spec2
∆
= ∧ (h = 0) ∧ (m = 0)
∧ ✷[ ∧ m ′ = (m + 1)%60
∧ h′ = if m ′ = 0 then (h + 1)%24 else h ]〈h,m 〉
(5.2)
If we ignore the variable m in Spec2, then we get a clock that displays only
the hour. Thus, ∃ m : Spec2 should be equivalent to Spec1. (The 59 steps each
hour that change only m are stuttering steps that are allowed by Spec1.) It’s
easy to see that Spec2 implies Spec1, so ∃m : Spec2 implies Spec1. There is no
refinement mapping with which we can prove that Spec1 implies ∃m : Spec2 . To
construct the necessary refinement mapping we need to add an auxiliary variable
s to Spec1 to obtain a specification Spec
s
1 that adds 59 steps that change only s
to each step that increments h. Such an auxiliary variable is called a stuttering
variable because it changes Spec1 only by requiring it to add steps that leave
the variable h of Spec1 unchanged.
To add such a variable s to a specification Spec to form Specs , we let the
next-state action of Specs take “normal” steps that satisfy the next-state action
of Spec when s equals ⊤ (usually read “top”), which is some value that is not
a positive integer. The value of s in the initial state equals ⊤. When s is set
to a positive integer, the specification Specs allows only stuttering steps that
decrement s , leaving the variables of Spec unchanged. When s counts down to
zero, it is set equal to ⊤ again. We add these stuttering steps before and/or after
steps of some particular subaction of the next-state action. Here, we assume that
this is a “simple” subaction, meaning that its context is empty.
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Suppose we want the specification Specs to add stuttering steps to each step
of a particular subaction. We replace each subaction A by the action As defined
as follows. For each A other than that particular subaction, we define As by:
As
∆
= (s = ⊤) ∧ A ∧ (s ′ = s)(5.3)
To add initVal stuttering steps after a step of an action A, for a positive integer
initVal (whose value may depend on the variables of Spec), we define
As
∆
= if s = ⊤
then A ∧ (s ′ = initVal)
else ∧ vars ′ = vars
∧ s ′ = if s = 1 then ⊤ else s − 1
We can generalize this by replacing the set of natural numbers with an arbitrary
set Σ having a well-founded partial order ≺ with smallest element ⊥ (read “bot-
tom”)6, letting initVal be an arbitrary element of Σ, replacing s = 1 with s = ⊥,
and replacing s− 1 by decr(s) for some operator decr such that decr(s) ≺ s for
all s ∈ Σ. The generalization is:
As
∆
= if s = ⊤
then A ∧ (s ′ = initVal)
else ∧ vars ′ = vars
∧ s ′ = if s = ⊥ then ⊤ else decr(s)
(5.4)
We can add initVal stuttering steps before an A step, rather than after it, as
follows. The stuttering steps should only be taken when they can be followed
by an A step, which is the case only when an A step is enabled. Remembering
that enabled A is the state predicate that is true iff an A step is enabled, the
stuttering steps can be added with this definition of As :
As
∆
= ∧ enabled A
∧ if s = ⊥ then A ∧ (s ′ = ⊤)
else ∧ vars ′ = vars
∧ s ′ = if s = ⊤ then initVal else decr(s)
(5.5)
We could generalize (5.4) and (5.5) to allow putting stuttering steps both before
and after an A step. We won’t bother to do this because it is probably sel-
dom needed, and it wouldn’t be significantly simpler than adding two separate
stuttering variables.
6 This means that ⊥ ≺ σ for all σ ∈ Σ, and any decreasing chain σ1 ≻ σ2 ≻ . . . of elements
in Σ must be finite.
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5.2 Adding Stuttering Steps to Multiple Actions
To generalize what we did in the preceding section, we first consider how to
add stuttering steps before or after an action A that may have a nonempty
context. We assume that the set Σ, its ⊥ element, and the operator decr do
not depend on the values of the context variables. (This should be true in most
real examples.) However, initVal may depend on them. We therefore must
make sure that initVal is evaluated with the values of the context variables for
which the action A is “executed”. This is no problem for stuttering steps added
after the A step, where As is defined by (5.4). (Since the stuttering steps do
nothing but decrement the value of s , it makes no difference for which value of
the context variables As is “executed” when s 6= ⊤.) However, it is a problem
for stuttering steps added before an A step, where As is defined by (5.5).
To solve the problem for As defined by (5.5), we let the non-⊤ values of s be
records with a val component that equals the value of s described in (5.5), and
a ctxt component that equals the tuple of values of the context when initVal is
evaluated. In other words, ctxt is set by the else clause in the second conjunct
of (5.5). The condition that s .ctxt equals the values of the context variables is
added as a conjunct to the then clause to make sure that A is executed only in
that context. The precise definition is given below.
We often need to add stuttering steps before or after more than one subac-
tion of the next-state action. We could do that by adding separate stuttering
variables, or we could introduce a stuttering array variable. However, because
the stuttering steps we add to an action all occur immediately before or after
that subaction, we can add them all with the same stuttering variable s . Stut-
tering steps can be added to each such subaction with its own set Σ and hence
its own values of initVal and ⊥ and of the operator decr . We just let the value of
s indicate the action to which the stuttering steps are being added. We do this
by adding to the non-⊤ values of s an additional id component that identifies
the action for which the stuttering steps are being added. The component is set
when s is first set to a non-⊤ value, and execution of the new subaction As is
enabled when s 6= ⊤ only if s .id equals the identifier of A.
We write the three definitions (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5) in TLA+ using the
three operators NoStutter , PostStutter , and PreStutter , respectively, shown in
Figure 15. The module should be instantiated by substituting the new stuttering
variable for s and the tuple of variables of the original specification for vars . It
defines ⊤, which is written top, to be a value that is different from the values
assigned to s by PostStutter and PreStutter actions (and that TLC knows is
different from those values). The other values in (5.4) and (5.5) are provided by
the following arguments to PostStutter and PreStutter .
A The action to which stuttering steps are being added.
id An identifier to distinguish that action A from other actions to
which stuttering steps are added. We like to let it be the name of 42
module Stuttering
top
∆
= [top 7→ “top”]
variables s , vars
NoStutter(A)
∆
= (s = top) ∧A ∧ (s ′ = s)
PostStutter(A, actionId , context , bot , initVal , decr( ))
∆
=
if s = top then ∧A
∧ s ′ = [id 7→ actionId , ctxt 7→ context , val 7→ initVal ]
else ∧ s .id = actionId
∧ unchanged vars
∧ s ′ = if s .val = bot then top
else [s except ! .val = decr(s .val)]
PreStutter(A, enabled , actionId , context , bot , initVal , decr( ))
∆
=
if s = top
then ∧ enabled
∧ unchanged vars
∧ s ′ = [id 7→ actionId , ctxt 7→ context , val 7→ initVal ]
else ∧ s .id = actionId
∧ if s .val = bot then ∧ s .ctxt = context
∧ A
∧ s ′ = top
else ∧ unchanged vars
∧ s ′ = [s except ! .val = decr(s .val)]
Figure 15: The beginning of the Stuttering module.
the action (which is a string).
bot The ⊥ (smallest) element of Σ.
initVal The value we have been calling by that name.
decr The operator we have been calling by that name. It must take a
single argument.
enabled A formula that should be equivalent to enabled A. We can often
find such a formula that TLC can evaluate much more efficiently
than enabled A. You can use TLC to check that enabled is equiv-
alent to enabled A by checking that enabled ≡ enabled A is an
invariant of the original specification.
context The tuple of context identifiers of A. (You can use i instead of
a 1-tuple 〈i 〉.) The context argument is used in the PostStutter 43
MayPostStutter(A, actionId , context , bot , initVal , decr( ))
∆
=
if s = top then ∧A
∧ s ′ = if initVal = bot
then s
else [id 7→ actionId , ctxt 7→ context ,
val 7→ initVal ]
else ∧ s .id = actionId
∧ unchanged vars
∧ s ′ = if decr(s .val) = bot
then top
else [s except ! .val = decr(s .val)]
MayPreStutter(A, enabled , actionId , context , bot , initVal , decr( ))
∆
=
if s = top
then ∧ enabled
∧ if initVal = bot
then A ∧ (s ′ = s)
else ∧ unchanged vars
∧ s ′ = [id 7→ actionId , ctxt 7→ context ,
val 7→ decr(initVal)]
else ∧ s .id = actionId
∧ if s .val = bot then ∧ s .ctxt = context
∧ A
∧ s ′ = top
else ∧ unchanged vars
∧ s ′ = [s except ! .val = decr(s .val)]
Figure 16: The end of the Stuttering module.
action only to set the ctxt component of s . This component may
be used in defining refinement mappings.
Note that PostStutter and PreStutter add at least one stuttering step, adding
exactly one such step if initVal = bot . It is often more convenient to use opera-
tors that add one fewer stuttering step. These are the operatorsMayPostStutter
andMayPreStutter defined in the Stuttering module as shown in Figure 16. Un-
like the original definitions, the actions they define do not execute any stuttering
step when initVal equals bot .
As a simple example, let formula Spec be defined as in Figure 17 to equal the
hour clock specification of (5.1). Let us suppose that a module HourMin defines
a formula Spec to equal the hour-minute clock specification Spec2 of (5.2). To
construct a refinement mapping under which the hour clock specification im-
plements the hour-minute clock specification, we add 59 stuttering steps before 44
module Hour
extends Integers
variable h
Init
∆
= h = 0
Next
∆
= h′ = (h + 1) % 24
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]h
Figure 17: The hour clock specification.
each Next step of the hour-clock specification. The obvious way to do that is
to let Σ be the set 1 . . 59 ordered by < , with ⊥ equal to 1 and initVal equal
to 59. However, our refinement mapping becomes simpler if we use the reverse
ordering > of 1 . . 59, with ⊥ equal to 59 and initVal equal to 1. The refinement
mapping can then define m to equal 0 when s = ⊤ and s .val when s 6= ⊤.
We use the operator PreStutter of the Stuttering module to define Nexts . We
instantiate that module with vars equal to h and with s equal to the stuttering
variable, which we also call s . For the arguments of PreStutter , observe that:
• Next is always enabled, so enabled Next equals true.
• Since we are adding stuttering steps to only one action, it doesn’t matter
what constant we choose for the actionId argument.
• Next , which is the only subaction in the trivial disjunctive representation
of Next , has a null context. We can therefore let the context argument be
any constant.
We therefore add the following to the end of module Hour .
vars
∆
= h
variable s
instance Stuttering
InitS
∆
= Init ∧ (s = top)
NextS
∆
= PreStutter(Next , true, “Next”, “ ”, 59, 1, lambda j : j + 1)
SpecS
∆
= InitS ∧ ✷[NextS ]〈vars, s〉
HM
∆
= instance HourMin with m ← if s = top then 0 else s .val
theorem SpecS ⇒ HM !Spec
TLC can easily check this theorem. 45
5.3 Correctness of Adding a Stuttering Variable
How do we check that adding a stuttering variable using the operators of the
Stuttering module produces a specification Specs such that ∃ s : Specs is equiv-
alent to the original specification Spec? The construction ensures that each
behavior of Specs is obtained by adding stuttering steps to a behavior of Spec,
so ∃ s : Specs implies Spec. It can fail to be equivalent to Spec only if it either
adds an infinite sequence of stuttering steps, or if we have used an incorrect
enabled argument for PreStutter . It will be equivalent to Spec if the following
conditions are satisfied for every use of the PostStutter and PreStutter operators,
with arguments named as above, for some constant set Σ:
1. For every σ in Σ, the sequence of values σ, decr(σ), decr(decr(σ)), . . . is
contained in Σ and eventually reaches bot .
2. initVal is in Σ.
3. enabled is equivalent to enabled A [for PreStutter only]
Condition 1 is a condition only on the constants Σ, bot , and decr . It can be
written as StutterConstantCondition(Σ, bot , decr) using the following definition
from the Stuttering module:
StutterConstantCondition(Sigma, bot , decr( ))
∆
=
let InverseDecr(S )
∆
= {sig ∈ Sigma \ S : decr(sig) ∈ S}
R[n ∈ Nat ]
∆
= if n = 0 then {bot}
else let T
∆
= R[n − 1]
in T ∪ InverseDecr(T )
in Sigma = union {R[n] : n ∈ Nat}
This condition can be checked by TLC by putting it into an assume statement
or else putting it in the Evaluate Constant Expression field of a model’s Model
Checking Results page. In either case, the model must replace Nat by a 0 . . n
for a (sufficiently large) integer n, and Σ must also be replaced with a finite set
if it is infinite. The Stuttering module defines AltStutterConstantCondition to
be equivalent to StutterConstantCondition if Σ is finite, and it doesn’t require
redefining Nat .
The last two conditions are ones that need only hold for behaviors of Spec.
They can be stated formally as follows, where A is a subaction with con-
text 〈k;K〉 :
Spec ⇒ ✷[∀〈k;K〉 : A⇒ (initVal ∈ Σ)]vars(5.6)
Spec ⇒ ✷(∀〈k;K〉 : enabled ≡ enabled A)(5.7)
TLC can check them in the obvious way.
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5.4 Adding Infinite Stuttering
The type of stuttering variable we have been describing adds a finite number of
stuttering steps before or after a step of a subaction. There is another type of
stuttering variable that adds an infinite number of stuttering steps not associated
with an action. You are unlikely ever to have to use one, but we include it for
completeness.
Suppose we want to find a refinement mapping under which a spec Spec1
that allows only halting behaviors implements a spec Spec2 that allows behaviors
in which externally visible variables stop changing, but internal variables keep
changing forever. We obviously can’t do that, because if all the variables of Spec1
stop changing, then no expression defined in terms of those variables can keep
changing forever. None of the methods we have described thus far for adding an
auxiliary variable a to Spec1 can help us, because they all have the property that
if every behavior allowed by Spec1 halts, then so does every behavior allowed by
Speca1 .
It’s hard to devise a practical example in which this problem would arise.
One possibility is for Spec2 to have a server perform internal actions looking for
user input that may never arrive, while in Spec1 the server just waits for input.
Although unlikely to arise, the problem is easy to solve, so we briefly sketch a
solution.
The solution is to add a stuttering variable that is required to stutter for-
ever. Let Spec equal Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars and let UC be the stuttering action
unchanged vars . Since [Next ]vars equals Next ∨ UC , we can write Spec as
Init ∧ ✷[Next ∨ UC ]vars . We can therefore add the subaction UC to any
disjunctive representation of Next . We add a history variable s as described
in Section 3, using a disjunctive representation containing the subaction UC .
This defines an action As for every subaction A and produces the specification
Inits ∧ ✷[Nexts]〈vars,s 〉. (We choose UC
s so it implies s ′ 6= s .) We then define
Specs to equal
Inits ∧ ✷[Nexts ]〈vars,s 〉 ∧WF〈vars,s 〉(UC
s )
Since enabled UC s equals true, the fairness requirement WF〈vars,s 〉(UC
s )
implies that infinitely many UC s steps occur. These are steps that leave the
variables in vars unchanged, changing only s . Since we have added s as a
history variable, ∃ s : Inits ∧ ✷[Nexts ]〈vars,s 〉 is equivalent to Spec. Since any
TLA+ spec allows stuttering steps, this implies that ∃ s : Specs is equivalent to
Spec.
5.5 Liveness
Liveness poses no problem when adding a stuttering variable. As with other
auxiliary variables, we obtain Specs by adding the stuttering variable to the
safety part of Spec and then conjoining to it the liveness conjunct of Spec. (This 47
is true as well for the kind of stuttering variable described in Section 5.4, where
Specs contains a liveness conjunct.)
Although Specs may have an unusual form, it isn’t weird. If Spec is machine
closed then Specs is also machine closed. However, putting it into a standard
form with fairness conditions only on subactions of Nexts is not as simple as it
is for history variables.
6 The Snapshot Problem
We now consider an example of using auxiliary variables to show that an algo-
rithm satisfies its specification. Our example is based on an algorithm of Afek
et al. [3]. Their algorithm implements what they call a single-writer atomic
snapshot memory, which will call simply a snapshot object. Their algorithm
implements a snapshot object using an unbounded amount of storage. They
also present a second algorithm that uses a bounded amount of storage and
implements a more general type of object, but we restrict ourselves to their
first, simpler algorithm. Moreover, we consider only a simplified version of this
simpler algorithm; their algorithm can be checked by adding the same auxiliary
variables used for the simplified version.
6.1 Linearizability
A snapshot algorithm is used to implement an atomic read of an array of memory
registers, each of which can be written by a different process. Its specification is a
special case of a linearizable specification of a data object—a concept introduced
by Herlihy and Wing [4].
A data object, also called a state machine, executes commands from user
processes. It is described by an initial state of the object and an operator
Apply, where Apply(i , cmd , st) describes the output and new state of the object
that results from process i executing command cmd when the object has state
st . It is specified formally by these declared constants:
constants Procs , Commands( ), Outputs( ), InitObj ,
Apply( , , )
They have the following meanings:
Procs The set of processes.
Commands(i) The set of commands that process i can issue.
Outputs(i) The set of outputs the commands issued by process i can
produce.
InitObj The initial state of the object. 48
Apply(i , cmd , st) A record with output and newState fields describing the re-
sult of process i executing command cmd when the object
is in state st .
A linearizable implementation of the data object is one in which the state of
the object is internal, the only externally visible actions being the issuing of the
command and the return of its output. More precisely, a process i executes a
command cmd with a BeginOp(i , cmd) step, followed by a DoOp(i) step that
modifies the state of the object, followed by an EndOp(i) step. The BeginOp
and EndOp steps are externally visible, meaning that they modify externally
visible variables (and perhaps internal variables), while the DoOp step modifies
only internal variables—including an internal variable describing the state of the
object.
To simplify the specification, we assume that the sets of commands and
of outputs are disjoint. We can then use a single externally visible variable
interface, letting BeginOp(i , cmd) set interface[i ] to the command cmd and let-
ting EndOp(i) set it to the command’s output. We also introduce an internal
variable istate to hold the internal state of the processes—needed to remem-
ber, while a process is executing a command, whether or not it has performed
the DoOp step and, if it has, what output was produced. We do this by let-
ting BeginOp(i , cmd) set istate[i ] to cmd , and letting DoOp(i) set it to the
command’s output. Here is the definition of the next-state action and its sub-
actions.
BeginOp(i , cmd)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ Outputs(i)
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = cmd ]
∧ istate ′ = [istate except ! [i ] = cmd ]
∧ object ′ = object
DoOp(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ Commands(i)
∧ istate[i ] = interface[i ]
∧ let result
∆
= Apply(i , interface[i ], object)
in ∧ object ′ = result .newState
∧ istate ′ = [istate except ! [i ] = result .output ]
∧ interface ′ = interface
EndOp(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ Commands(i)
∧ istate[i ] ∈ Outputs(i)
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = istate[i ]]
∧ unchanged 〈object , istate〉
Next
∆
= ∃ i ∈ Procs : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ Commands(i) : BeginOp(i , cmd)
∨DoOp(i)
∨ EndOp(i)
Initially, interface[i ] and istate[i ] equal some output, for each i . We let that 49
module Linearizability
constants Procs , Commands( ), Outputs( ), InitOutput( ),
ObjValues , InitObj , Apply( , , )
assume LinearAssumps
∆
=
∧ InitObj ∈ ObjValues
∧ ∀ i ∈ Procs : InitOutput(i) ∈ Outputs(i)
∧ ∀ i ∈ Procs : Outputs(i) ∩ Commands(i) = {}
∧ ∀ i ∈ Procs , obj ∈ ObjValues :
∀ cmd ∈ Commands(i) :
∧ Apply(i , cmd , obj ).output ∈ Outputs(i)
∧ Apply(i , cmd , obj ).newState ∈ ObjValues
variables object , interface, istate
vars
∆
= 〈object , interface, istate〉
Init
∆
= ∧ object = InitObj
∧ interface = [i ∈ Procs 7→ InitOutput(i)]
∧ istate = [i ∈ Procs 7→ InitOutput(i)]
BeginOp(i , cmd)
∆
= . . .
DoOp(i)
∆
= . . .
EndOp(i)
∆
= . . .
Next
∆
= . . .
SafeSpec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Fairness
∆
= ∀ i ∈ Procs : WFvars(DoOp(i)) ∧WFvars(EndOp(i))
Spec
∆
= Init ∧✷[Next ]vars ∧ Fairness
Figure 18: Module Linearizability.
equal InitOutput(i) for some constant operator InitOutput . We also add a fair-
ness requirement to imply that any command that has begun (with a BeginOp
step) eventually completes (with an EndOp step). The complete specification
(with the action definitions above elided) is in module Linearizability, shown in
Figure 18. Any particular linearizable object can be specified by instantiating
the module with the appropriate constants. The module includes an assumption
named LinearAssumps , to check that the instantiated constants satisfy the prop-
erties they should for the module to specify a linearizable object. To state all
those properties, the specification introduces a constant ObjValues to describe
the set of all possible states of the object. This set could be defined to equal
the following rather complicated expression. Trying to understand it provides a
good lesson in set theory. 50
let ApplyProcTo(i , S )
∆
=
{Apply(i , cmd , x ).newState : x ∈ S , cmd ∈ Commands(i)}
ApplyTo(S )
∆
= union {ApplyProcTo(i , S ) : i ∈ Procs}
ApplyITimes [i ∈ Nat ]
∆
=
if i = 0 then {InitObj}
else ApplyTo(ApplyITimes [i − 1])
in union {ApplyITimes [i ] : i ∈ Nat}
6.2 The Linearizable Snapshot Specification
By a snapshot object, we mean what Afek et al. [3] called an atomic snap-
shot memory. In a snapshot object, the processes are either readers or writers.
Reader and writer should be thought of as roles; the same physical process can
act as both a reader and a writer. A snapshot object is an array of registers,
one per writer. A write operation writes a value to the writer’s register and
produces as output some fixed value that is not a possible register value. A read
operation has a single command that produces the object’s state (an array of
register values) as output and leaves that state unchanged.
The specification declares four constants: the sets Readers and Writers of
reader and writer processes; the set RegVals of possible register values; and a
value InitRegVal in RegVals that is the initial value of a register. We call the
snapshot object a memory and use different names for some of the parameters of
the Linearizability module, including MemVals and InitMem for ObjValues and
InitObj . We define NotMemVal be the single reader command and NotRegVal
to be the single write command output. The complete specification is in module
LinearSnapshot of Figure 19. (The assume is added at the end of the module so
TLC will check that the assumption LinearAssumps of module Linearizability
is true under the instantiation.)
6.3 The Simplified Afek et al. Snapshot Algorithm
The snapshot algorithm of Afek et al. uses an internal variable imem whose
value is an array with imem[i ] a pair consisting of the value of the ith register
and an integer whose value is the number of times the register has been written.
It assumes that the entire pair can be read and written atomically.
A write operation writes the register value cmd in the obvious way, the
DoOp(i) action setting imem[i ] to 〈cmd , imem[i ][2] + 1〉.
A read operation first performs the following scan procedure:
It reads all the elements imem[i ] once, in any order. It then reads them
a second time, again in any order. If it reads the same values both times
for all i , it outputs the array of register values it read.
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module LinearSnapshot
constants Readers , Writers , RegVals , InitRegVal
assume ∧ Readers ∩Writers = {}
∧ InitRegVal ∈ RegVals
Procs
∆
= Readers ∪Writers
MemVals
∆
= [Writers → RegVals ]
InitMem
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→ InitRegVal ]
NotMemVal
∆
= choose v : v /∈ MemVals
NotRegVal
∆
= choose v : v /∈ RegVals
Commands(i)
∆
= if i ∈ Readers then {NotMemVal}
else RegVals
Outputs(i)
∆
= if i ∈ Readers then MemVals
else {NotRegVal}
InitOutput(i)
∆
= if i ∈ Readers then InitMem else NotRegVal
Apply(i , cmd , obj )
∆
= if i ∈ Readers
then [newState 7→ obj , output 7→ obj ]
else [newState 7→ [obj except ! [i ] = cmd ],
output 7→ NotRegVal ]
variables mem, interface, istate
instance Linearizability with ObjValues ← MemVals , InitObj ← InitMem,
object ← mem
assume LinearAssumps
Figure 19: Module LinearSnapshot.
If the values obtained for each element imem[i ] by the two reads are not all the
same, so the scan procedure does not produce an output, then the procedure is
repeated. The scan procedure is repeated again and again until it produces an
output.
The actual algorithm has an alternative method of producing an output
that can be used when it has read three different values for imem[i ], for some
writer i . By using this method, termination of the read is assured. However, for
simplicity, we use an algorithm that keeps performing the scan procedure until
it succeeds in producing an output. Thus, a read need never terminate, so the
algorithm does not satisfy the liveness requirement of a snapshot algorithm— 52
namely, it does not satisfy the weak fairness requirement of the DoOp(i) action
for a reader i . However, it does satisfy the safety requirement. The correctness
of the complete algorithm (including liveness) can be verified by essentially the
same method used for our simplified version; but the complete algorithm is more
complicated, so the refinement mapping is more complicated and model checking
takes longer. We therefore consider only the simplified algorithm.
To specify the algorithm in TLA+, we declare the same constants Readers ,
Writers , RegVals , and InitRegVal and make the same definitions of MemVals ,
InitMem, NotMemVal , and NotRegVal as in module LinearSnapshot above. We
also define:
IRegVals
∆
= RegVals ×Nat
IMemVals
∆
= [Writers → IRegVals ]
InitIMem
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→ 〈InitRegVal , 0〉]
We declare five variables, with the following meanings:
interface : The same as in LinearSnapshot .
imem : Like mem in LinearSnapshot , except imem[i ] is an ordered pair
in RegVals ×Nat , the first component representing mem[i ] and the
second the number of times mem[i ] has been written. The initial
value of imem is initially InitIMem.
wrNum : A function with domain Writers , where wrNum[i ] is the num-
ber of BeginWr(i) steps that have been taken.
rdVal1, rdVal2 : They are functions such that rdVal1[i ] and rdVal2[i ]
describe the values read so far by reader i in the two reads of the
scan procedure. Both rdVal1[i ] and rdVal2[i ] are functions whose
domain is the set of writers j for which the first or second read of
imem[j ] has been performed, mapping each such j to the value read.
They are set initially to the empty function (the function with empty
domain), which we write 〈 〉.
The writer actions are straightforward. Note that because wrNum[i ] counts
the number of BeginWr(i , cmd) steps and imem[i ][2] is set to wrNum[i ] by
the DoWr(i), the EndWrite(i) action should be enabled and DoWr(i) disabled
when imem[i ][2] equals wrNum[i ].
BeginWr(i , cmd)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotRegVal
∧ wrNum ′ = [wrNum except ! [i ] = wrNum[i ] + 1]
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = cmd ]
∧ unchanged 〈imem, rdVal1, rdVal2〉
DoWr(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ RegVals
∧ imem[i ][2] 6= wrNum[i ]
∧ imem ′ = [imem except ! [i ] = 〈interface[i ], wrNum[i ]〉] 53
∧ unchanged 〈interface, wrNum, rdVal1, rdVal2〉
EndWr(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ RegVals
∧ imem[i ][2] = wrNum[i ]
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = NotRegVal ]
∧ unchanged 〈imem, wrNum, rdVal1, rdVal2〉
The BeginRd(i) action is straightforward.
BeginRd(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ MemVals
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = NotMemVal ]
∧ unchanged 〈imem, wrNum, rdVal1, rdVal2〉
The definitions of the actions that perform the scan procedure use the following
definition. We define AddToFcn(f , x , v) to be the function g obtained from
the function f by adding x to its domain and defining g[x ] to equal v . Using
operators defined in the TLC module, it can be defined to equal f@@(x :> v).
However, it’s easy enough to define it directly as:
AddToFcn(f , x , v)
∆
=
[y ∈ (domain f ) ∪ {x} 7→ if y = x then v else f [y]]
Using AddToFcn, we define the Rd1 action that performs the scan’s first read
of imem and the Rd2 action that performs its second read.
Rd1(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotMemVal
∧ ∃ j ∈ Writers \domain rdVal1[i ] :
rdVal1′ = [rdVal1 except
! [i ] = AddToFcn(rdVal1[i ], j , imem[j ])]
∧ unchanged 〈interface, imem, wrNum, rdVal2〉
Rd2(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotMemVal
∧ domain rdVal1[i ] =Writers
∧ ∃ j ∈ Writers \domain rdVal2[i ] :
rdVal2′ = [rdVal2 except
! [i ] = AddToFcn(rdVal2[i ], j , imem[j ])]
∧ unchanged 〈interface, imem, wrNum, rdVal1〉
Finally, we define TryEndRd(i) to be an action that is enabled when the reader’s
scan operation has completed. It compares the values read by the two sets of
reads and, if they are equal, it performs the EndOp for the read. Otherwise, it
enables the next scan to begin.
TryEndRd(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotMemVal
∧ domain rdVal1[i ] = Writers
∧ domain rdVal2[i ] = Writers 54
∧ if rdVal1[i ] = rdVal2[i ]
then interface ′ =
[interface except
! [i ] = [j ∈ Writers 7→ rdVal1[i ][j ][1]]]
else interface ′ = interface
∧ rdVal1′ = [rdVal1 except ! [i ] = 〈〉]
∧ rdVal2′ = [rdVal2 except ! [i ] = 〈〉]
∧ unchanged 〈imem, wrNum〉
The complete specification is in module AfekSimplified , shown in Figure 20 with
the action definitions above elided.
6.4 Another Snapshot Specification
The algorithm in module AfekSimplified satisfies the safety specification in
LinearSnapshot , but we now show that it does not implement that safety speci-
fication under any refinement mapping. Let SpecA be the algorithm’s specifica-
tion and let SSpecL be the specification SafeSpec of LinearSnapshot . We assume
there is a refinement mapping mem ← mem and istate ← istate under which
SpecA implements SSpecL and obtain a contradiction. Let F be the formula
obtained from a formula F of module LinearSnapshot by replacing mem with
mem and istate with istate. Consider a behavior satisfying SpecA that begins
with the following three sequences of steps.
1. Reader i does a BeginRd(i) step, completes its first scan (so
domain rdVal1[i ] equals Writers) and begins its second scan by read-
ing imem[j ] = 〈v1, 0〉 for some writer j and v1 in RegVals (so
domain rdVal2[i ] equals {j} and rdVal2[i ][j ] equals 〈v1, 0〉).
2. Writer j then does a complete write operation, writing a new value v2
different from v1.
3. Reader i completes its second scan, executes its TryEndRd(i) action, find-
ing rdVal2[i ] equal to rdVal1[i ], and completing the read operation by
setting interface[i ] to a value M with M [j ] = v1.
The behavior satisfies SSpecL, so this sequence of actions must start with a
BeginRd(i) step, contain a DoRd(i) step, and end with an EndRd(i) step. The
reader has not determined the value to be output by the read command until it
has finished its second scan, so the DoRd(i) step must occur in sequence 3. The
three steps of the write of v2 by writer j occur in sequence 2, so the DoWr(j )
step for that write must occur in that sequence, therefore preceding the DoRd(i)
step. Hence, the LinearSnapshot spec implies that the DoRd(i) step must set
istate[i ][j ] to v2. However in the last step of 3, the reader sets the value of
interface[i ][j ] to v1, which implies that the DoRd(i) step set istate[i ][j ] to v1. 55
module AfekSimplified
extends Integers
constants Readers , Writers , RegVals , InitRegVal
MemVals
∆
= [Writers → RegVals ]
InitMem
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→ InitRegVal ]
NotMemVal
∆
= choose v : v /∈ MemVals
NotRegVal
∆
= choose v : v /∈ RegVals
IRegVals
∆
= RegVals ×Nat
IMemVals
∆
= [Writers → IRegVals ]
InitIMem
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→ 〈InitRegVal , 0〉]
variables imem, interface, wrNum, rdVal1, rdVal2
vars
∆
= 〈imem, interface, wrNum, rdVal1, rdVal2〉
Init
∆
= ∧ imem = InitIMem
∧ interface = [i ∈ Readers ∪Writers 7→
if i ∈ Readers then InitMem else NotRegVal ]
∧ wrNum = [i ∈ Writers 7→ 0]
∧ rdVal1 = [i ∈ Readers 7→ 〈〉]
∧ rdVal2 = [i ∈ Readers 7→ 〈〉]
BeginWr(i , cmd)
∆
= . . .
DoWr(i)
∆
= . . .
EndWr(i)
∆
= . . .
BeginRd(i)
∆
= . . .
AddToFcn(f , x , v)
∆
= . . .
Rd1(i)
∆
= . . .
Rd2(i)
∆
= . . .
TryEndRd(i)
∆
= . . .
Next
∆
= ∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : BeginRd(i) ∨ Rd1(i) ∨ Rd2(i) ∨ TryEndRd(i)
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWr(i , cmd)
∨DoWr(i) ∨ EndWr(i)
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Figure 20: Module AfekSimplified
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Since v1 6= v2, this is a contradiction, showing that the refinement mapping
cannot exist.
This behavior of SpecA is allowed by ∃ mem, istate : SSpecL , since we can
choose values of mem and istate for which SSpecL is satisfied—namely, values
for which the DoRd(i) step occurs before the DoWr(j ) step. However, choosing
those values requires knowing what steps occur after the DoWr(j ) step. The
linearizability specification SSpecL chooses the value returned by a read sooner
than it has to. This tells us that to find a refinement mapping that shows SpecA
implements ∃mem, istate : SSpecL , we must add a prophecy variable to SpecA.
Instead of adding a prophecy variable to SpecA, we write a new snapshot
specification SpecNL that allows the same externally visible behaviors as specifi-
cation SpecL of LinearSnapshot ; and whose safety specification SSpecNL allows
the same visible behaviors as SSpecL. However, in SpecNL we make a reader
wait as long as possible before choosing its output value. We can then find a
refinement mapping to show that SpecA implements SSpecNL without using a
prophecy variable.
We will still need a prophecy variable to show that SSpecNL allows the same
externally visible behavior as SSpecL. The advantage of introducing SpecNL is
that the specification of what an algorithm is supposed to do is generally much
simpler than the algorithm. Prophecy variables are the most complicated kind of
auxiliary variables, and it is easier to add one to a high-level specification than to
a lower-level algorithm. (This same idea of modifying the high-level specification
to avoid adding a prophecy variable to the algorithm can be applied to the queue
example of Herlihy and Wing [4].)
Specification SpecNL records in its internal state all values of the memory
mem that a read operation is allowed to return. The EndRd operation non-
deterministically chooses one of those values as its output. Its internal state
therefore remembers much more about what happened in the past than a rea-
sonable implementation would. This means that defining a refinement mapping
under which an algorithm implements SpecNL will require adding a history vari-
able to the algorithm’s spec. Adding a history variable is much easier than
adding a prophecy variable.
We write specification SpecNL (and SSpecNL) in module NewLinearSnapshot .
It has the same declarations of Readers , Writers , RegVals , and InitRegVal and
the same definitions of MemVals , InitMem, NotMemVal , and NotRegVal as in
module LinearSnapshot . It has the same variables interface and mem as module
LinearSnapshot , plus these two internal variables:
wstate A function with domain Writers such that the value wstate[i ] is the
same as the value of istate[i ] in LinearSnapshot , for each writer i .
rstate A function with domain Readers so that, for each reader i currently
executing a read operation, rstate[i ] is the sequence of values that
mem has assumed thus far while the operation has been executing. 57
The first element of rstate[i ] is therefore the value mem had when
the BeginRd(i) step occurred. The value of rstate[i ] is the empty
sequence 〈 〉 when i is not executing a read operation.
The BeginWr command is essentially the same as in LinearSnapshot .
BeginWr(i , cmd)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotRegVal
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = cmd ]
∧ wstate ′ = [wstate except ! [i ] = cmd ]
∧ unchanged 〈mem, rstate〉
The BeginRd(i) command, which sets rstate[i ] to a one-element sequence con-
taining the current value of mem, is:
BeginRd(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ MemVals
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = NotMemVal ]
∧ rstate ′ = [rstate except ! [i ] = 〈mem〉]
∧ unchanged 〈mem, wstate〉
The writer executes a DoWr that is the same as in LinearSnapshot , except that
it also appends the new value of mem to the end of rstate[j ] for every reader j
currently executing a read operation.
DoWr(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ RegVals
∧ wstate[i ] = interface[i ]
∧mem ′ = [mem except ! [i ] = interface[i ]]
∧ wstate ′ = [wstate except ! [i ] = NotRegVal ]
∧ rstate ′ = [j ∈ Readers 7→
if rstate[j ] = 〈〉
then 〈〉
else Append(rstate[j ], mem ′)]
∧ interface ′ = interface
A reader i has no internal actions, only the externally visible BeginRd(i) and
EndRd(i) actions. Its EndRd(i) action outputs an arbitrarily chosen element of
rstate[i ].
EndRd(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotMemVal
∧ ∃ j ∈ 1 . . Len(rstate[i ]) :
interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = rstate[i ][j ]]
∧ rstate ′ = [rstate except ! [i ] = 〈〉]
∧ unchanged 〈mem, wstate〉
The writer’s EndWr action is essentially the same as in LinearSnapshot .
EndWr(i)
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] ∈ RegVals
∧ wstate[i ] = NotRegVal
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = wstate[i ]]
∧ unchanged 〈mem, rstate, wstate〉
The complete module, minus the action definitions above, is in Figure 21. 58
module NewLinearSnapshot
extends Integers , Sequences
constants Readers , Writers , RegVals , InitRegVal
assume ∧ Readers ∩Writers = {}
∧ InitRegVal ∈ RegVals
InitMem
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→ InitRegVal ]
MemVals
∆
= [Writers → RegVals ]
NotMemVal
∆
= choose v : v /∈ MemVals
NotRegVal
∆
= choose v : v /∈ RegVals
variables mem, interface, rstate, wstate
vars
∆
= 〈mem, interface, rstate, wstate〉
Init
∆
= ∧mem = InitMem
∧ interface = [i ∈ Readers ∪Writers 7→
if i ∈ Readers then InitMem else NotRegVal ]
∧ rstate = [i ∈ Readers 7→ 〈〉]
∧ wstate = [i ∈ Writers 7→ NotRegVal ]
BeginRd(i)
∆
= . . .
BeginWr(i , cmd)
∆
= . . .
DoWr(i)
∆
= . . .
EndRd(i)
∆
= . . .
EndWr(i)
∆
= . . .
Next
∆
= ∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : BeginRd(i) ∨ EndRd(i)
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWr(i , cmd)
∨DoWr(i) ∨ EndWr(i)
SafeSpec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
Fairness
∆
= ∧ ∀ i ∈ Readers : WFvars(EndRd(i))
∧ ∀ i ∈ Writers : WFvars(DoWr(i)) ∧WFvars(EndWr(i))
Spec
∆
= Init ∧✷[Next ]vars ∧ Fairness
Figure 21: Module NewLinearSnapshot
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6.5 NewLinearSnapshot Implements LinearSnapshot
For compactness, in the following discussion we let:
SL
∆
= ∃mem, istate : SpecL
SNL
∆
= ∃mem, rstate,wstate : SpecNL
Specifications SL and SNL are equivalent. However, our goal is to prove that
SpecA implements SL, for which it suffices to show that it implements specifica-
tion SNL and that SNL implements SL. So, we won’t bother showing equivalence
of the two specs; we just show here that SNL implements SL. We show in Sec-
tion 6.6 below that SpecA implements SNL.
To show that SNL implements SL, we add to SpecNL a prophecy vari-
able p then a stuttering variable s to obtain a specification SpecpsNL such that
∃ s , p : SpecpsNL is equivalent to SpecNL. We then show that ∃ s , p : Spec
ps
NL imple-
ments SL by showing that Spec
ps
NL implements SpecL under a suitable refinement
mapping mem ← mem, istate ← istate.
The two auxiliary variables we add to SpecNL have the following functions:
p A prophecy variable that predicts for each reader i which element of the
sequence of memory values rstate[i ] will be chosen as the output.
s A stuttering variable that adds:
• A single stuttering step after a BeginRd(i) step if p[i ] predicts that
the read will return the current value of memory. The refinement
mapping will be defined so that stuttering step will be a DoRd(i).
• Stuttering steps after aDoWr(i) step that will implement the DoRd(j )
step of every current read operation that returns the value of mem
immediately after the DoWr(i) step.
Both these variables are added in a single module named NewLinearSnapshotPS .
6.5.1 Adding the Prophecy Variable
The prophecy variable p is a prophecy data structure variable as described in
Section 4.4. Its domain Dom is the set of readers that are currently executing
a read, which can be described as the set of readers i such that rstate[i ] is a
nonempty sequence. The value of p[i ] is a positive integer that predicts which
element of the list rstate[i ] will be chosen as the output. This value can be
arbitrarily large, since arbitrarily many writes can occur during a read operation,
so Π is the set Nat \ {0}. Module NewLinearSnapshotPS therefore begins
extends NewLinearSnapshot
Pi
∆
= Nat \ {0}
Dom
∆
= {r ∈ Readers : rstate[r ] 6= 〈〉}
instance Prophecy with DomPrime ← Dom ′ 60
It is most convenient to define p in terms of a disjunctive representation
in which EndRd(i) is decomposed into ∃ j ∈ 1 . .Len(rstate[i ]) : IEndRd(i , j ) ,
where IEndRd can be defined by:
IEndRd(i , j )
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotMemVal
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = rstate[i ][j ]]
∧ rstate ′ = [rstate except ! [i ] = 〈〉]
∧ unchanged 〈mem, wstate〉
We could make the change in our original specification NewLinearSnapshot , but
instead we define a new next-state action Nxt that is equivalent to Next :
Nxt
∆
= ∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : ∨ BeginRd(i)
∨ ∃ j ∈ 1 . . Len(rstate[i ]) : IEndRd(i , j )
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWr(i , cmd)
∨DoWr(i) ∨ EndWr(i)
It’s easy to see that Nxt is equivalent to formula Next of NewLinearSnapShot ,
and TLAPS can easily check this proof.
theorem Next = Nxt
by def Next , Nxt , EndRd , IEndRd
A prediction is made for reader i when the element i is added to Dom, which is
done by a BeginRd(i) step. The prediction is used by the IEndRd(i , j ) action,
allowing it to be performed only if p[i ] has predicted that the j th item in the
sequence rstate[i ] will be output. The definitions of PredA, PredDomA, and
DomInjA for the subactions A are given along with the beginning of the module
in Figure 22. The module next defines the temporal formula Condition, which
should be implied by Spec. There follows the definition of the specification
SpecP obtained by adding the prophecy variable p to Spec. TLC can check that
Condition is implied by Spec, which implies that ∃ p : SpecP is equivalent to
Spec. These definitions appear in Figure 23.
6.5.2 Adding the Stuttering Variable
The module next adds the stuttering variable s to SpecS . We need to add a
single stuttering step after a BeginRdP(i) step iff the reader will output the
current value of mem, which is the case iff the step sets p[i ] to 1. We also need
to add a stuttering step after DoWrP(i) for every currently reading reader j for
which p[j ] predicts that the value of mem that the step appends to rstate[j ] is
the one that the read will output. These steps are added by letting the values of
s .val be subsets of readers, ordered by the subset relation, with the decrement
operation removing an element from the set chosen with the choose operator.
The specification SpecPS obtained by adding the stuttering variable s to
SpecP is defined in the part of module NewLinearSnapshotPS shown in Figure 24. 61
module NewLinearSnapshotPS
extends NewLinearSnapshot
Pi
∆
= Nat \ {0}
Dom
∆
= {r ∈ Readers : rstate[r ] 6= 〈〉}
instance Prophecy with DomPrime ← Dom ′
IEndRd(i , j )
∆
= ∧ interface[i ] = NotMemVal
∧ interface ′ = [interface except ! [i ] = rstate[i ][j ]]
∧ rstate ′ = [rstate except ! [i ] = 〈〉]
∧ unchanged 〈mem, wstate〉
Nxt
∆
= ∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : ∨ BeginRd(i)
∨ ∃ j ∈ 1 . . Len(rstate[i ]) : IEndRd(i , j )
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWr(i , cmd)
∨DoWr(i) ∨ EndWr(i)
theorem Next = Nxt
by def Next , Nxt , EndRd , IEndRd
PredBeginRd(p)
∆
= true
PredDomBeginRd
∆
= {}
DomInjBeginRd
∆
= IdFcn(Dom)
PredIEndRd(p, i , j )
∆
= j = p[i ]
PredDomIEndRd(i)
∆
= {i}
DomInjIEndRd
∆
= IdFcn(Dom ′)
PredBeginWr(p)
∆
= true
PredDomBeginWr
∆
= {}
DomInjBeginWr
∆
= IdFcn(Dom)
PredDoWr(p)
∆
= true
PredDomDoWr
∆
= {}
DomInjDoWr
∆
= IdFcn(Dom)
PredEndWr(p)
∆
= true
PredDomEndWr
∆
= {}
DomInjEndWr
∆
= IdFcn(Dom)
Figure 22: Module NewLinearSnapshotPS, part 1.
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Condition
∆
=
✷[ ∧ ∀ i ∈ Readers :
∧ ProphCondition(BeginRd(i), DomInjBeginRd ,
PredDomBeginRd , PredBeginRd)
∧ ∀ j ∈ 1 . . Len(rstate[i ]) :
ProphCondition(IEndRd(i , j ), DomInjIEndRd ,
PredDomIEndRd(i),
lambda p : PredIEndRd(p, i , j ))
∧ ∀ i ∈ Writers :
∧ ∀ cmd ∈ RegVals :
ProphCondition(BeginWr(i , cmd), DomInjBeginWr ,
PredDomBeginWr , PredBeginWr)
∧ ProphCondition(DoWr(i), DomInjDoWr , PredDomDoWr ,
PredDoWr)
∧ ProphCondition(EndWr(i), DomInjEndWr , PredDomEndWr ,
PredEndWr)
]vars
variable p
varsP
∆
= 〈vars , p〉
InitP
∆
= Init ∧ (p = EmptyFcn)
BeginRdP(i)
∆
= ProphAction(BeginRd(i), p, p′, DomInjBeginRd ,
PredDomBeginRd , PredBeginRd)
BeginWrP(i , cmd)
∆
= ProphAction(BeginWr(i , cmd), p, p′, DomInjBeginWr ,
PredDomBeginWr , PredBeginWr)
DoWrP(i)
∆
= ProphAction(DoWr(i), p, p′, DomInjDoWr ,
PredDomDoWr , PredDoWr)
IEndRdP(i , j )
∆
= ProphAction(IEndRd(i , j ), p, p′, DomInjIEndRd ,
PredDomIEndRd(i),
lambda q : PredIEndRd(q, i , j ))
EndWrP(i)
∆
= ProphAction(EndWr(i), p, p′, DomInjEndWr ,
PredDomEndWr , PredEndWr)
NextP
∆
= ∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : ∨ BeginRdP(i)
∨ ∃ j ∈ 1 . . Len(rstate[i ]) : IEndRdP(i , j )
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWrP(i , cmd)
∨DoWrP(i) ∨ EndWrP(i)
SpecP
∆
= InitP ∧ ✷[NextP ]varsP ∧ Fairness
Figure 23: Module NewLinearSnapshotPS, part 2.
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The two theorems at the beginning are conditions (5.6) for adding the stuttering
steps to BeginRdP(i) and DoWrP(i) steps. They can be checked by temporar-
ily ending the module immediately after those theorems and running TLC on
a model having SpecP as its specification. Two assume statements have been
added to check the constant conditions on the arguments of the MayPostStutter
operators used to add those stuttering steps.
6.5.3 The Refinement Mapping
Let’s again use the abbreviations SpecL for formula Spec of LinearSnapshot and
SpecPS for formula SpecPS of module NewLinearSnapshot . We now define the
state functions mem and istate such that SpecPS implements SpecL under the
refinement mapping mem ← mem, istate ← istate. We want writer actions of
SpecL to be simulated by the corresponding writer actions of SpecPS . Hence, we
let mem equal mem and we let istate[i ] equal wstate[i ] for every writer i . The
problem is defining istate[i ] for readers i .
In SpecL, for any process i not executing a read or write, istate[i ] equals
interface[i ]. Hence, we can define istate[i ] to equal interface[i ] for any reader
i not currently reading. We now consider the case when i is currently reading,
which is true iff rstate[i ] 6= 〈 〉, which implies p[i ] is a positive integer. There
are two possibilities:
p[i ] = 1 In this case, the DoRd(i) step of SpecL is simulated by the stuttering
step added to BeginRd(i). The DoRd(i) step changes istate[i ] from
NotMemVal to the memory value to be output, so istate[i ] should
equal rstate[i ][1] when rstate[i ] 6= 〈 〉, except after the BeginRd(i)
step and before the stuttering step added immediately after it.
p[i ] > 1 In this case, the DoRd(i) step of SpecL is simulated by one of the
stuttering steps added to the DoWr(j ) step for the writer that ap-
pends the p[i ]th element to rstate[i ]. We let it be the stuttering
step that removes i from s .val , so istate[i ] equals NotMemVal until
p[i ] ≤ Len(rstate[i ]) and it’s not the case that i is an element of
s .val while some writer is performing a stuttering step added after
its DoWr step.
The definition of istate, under the name istateBar , appears near the end of the
module, shown in Figure 25. The theorems at the end of the module can be
checked with TLC. In fact, TLC checks that SpecPS satisfies property LS !Spec
by checking that the safety part of SpecPS satisfies both (a) the safety part
of LS !Spec and (b) the property that the liveness part of SpecPS implies the
liveness part of LS !Spec. Therefore, having TLC check that SpecPS satisfies
LS !Spec checks both theorems.
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theorem SpecP ⇒ ✷[∀ i ∈ Readers : BeginRdP(i)⇒
(if p′[i ] = 1 then 1 else 0) ∈ {0, 1}]varsP
theorem SpecP ⇒ ✷[∀ i ∈ Writers , cmd ∈ RegVals :
DoWrP(i)⇒
{j ∈ Readers : (rstate[j ] 6= 〈〉)
∧ (p[j ] = Len(rstate ′[j ]))}
∈ (subset Readers)]varsP
variable s
varsPS
∆
= 〈vars , p, s〉
instance Stuttering with vars ← varsP
InitPS
∆
= InitP ∧ (s = top)
BeginRdPS (i)
∆
= MayPostStutter(BeginRdP(i), “BeginRd”, i , 0,
if p′[i ] = 1 then 1 else 0,
lambda j : j − 1)
assume StutterConstantCondition({0, 1}, 0, lambda j : j − 1)
BeginWrPS (i , cmd)
∆
= NoStutter(BeginWrP(i , cmd))
DoWrPS (i)
∆
= MayPostStutter(DoWrP(i), “DoWr”, i , {},
{j ∈ Readers :
(rstate[j ] 6= 〈〉) ∧ (p[j ] = Len(rstate ′[j ]))},
lambda S : S \ {choose x ∈ S : true})
assume StutterConstantCondition(subset Readers , {},
lambda S : S \ {choose x ∈ S : true})
IEndRdPS (i , j )
∆
= NoStutter(IEndRdP(i , j ))
EndWrPS (i)
∆
= NoStutter(EndWrP(i))
NextPS
∆
= ∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : ∨ BeginRdPS (i)
∨ ∃ j ∈ 1 . . Len(rstate[i ]) : IEndRdPS (i , j )
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWrPS (i , cmd)
∨DoWrPS (i) ∨ EndWrPS (i)
SafeSpecPS
∆
= InitPS ∧ ✷[NextPS ]varsPS
SpecPS
∆
= SafeSpecPS ∧ Fairness
Figure 24: Module NewLinearSnapshotPS, part 3.
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istateBar
∆
= [i ∈ Readers ∪Writers 7→
if i ∈ Writers
then wstate[i ]
else if rstate[i ] = 〈〉
then interface[i ]
else if p[i ] = 1
then if ∧ s 6= top
∧ s .id = “BeginRd”
∧ s .ctxt = i
then NotMemVal
else rstate[i ][1]
else if ∨ p[i ] > Len(rstate[i ])
∨ ∧ s 6= top
∧ s .id = “DoWr”
∧ i ∈ s .val
then NotMemVal
else rstate[i ][p[i ]]]
LS
∆
= instance LinearSnapshot with istate ← istateBar
theorem SafeSpecPS ⇒ LS !SafeSpec
theorem SpecPS ⇒ LS !Spec
Figure 25: Module NewLinearSnapshotPS, part 4.
6.6 AfekSimplified Implements NewLinearSnapshot
We now finish checking the correctness of the algorithm SpecA of AfekSimplified
by showing that it implements ∃mem, rstate,wstate : SSpecNL , where SSpecNL
is the safety specification of NewLinearSnapshot . As we suggested in Section 6.4,
finding a refinement mapping to show this requires adding a history variable to
SpecA that captures the information remembered by SSpecNL in the variable
rstate. This is straightforward. We just add a history variable h such that h[i ]
is changed by BeginRd(i), DoWr(i), and an ending TryEndRdH (i) action (one
executed with rdVal1[i ] = rdVal2[i ]) the same way rstate[i ] is changed by the
corresponding BeginRd(i), DoWr(i), and EndRd(i) action of SSpecNL.
The specification SpecH , obtained by adding the history variable h to spec-
ification Spec of module AfekSimplified , is defined in module AfekSimplified as
shown in Figure 26. The definition should be easy to understand by comparing
the definition of the initial predicate InitH and of the actions in the module
to the corresponding definitions in module NewLinearSnapshot . Note that the
action definitions use memBar where the corresponding action definitions in
NewLinearSnapshot use mem. The module defines memBar to equal the mem- 66
module AfekSimplifiedH
extends AfekSimplified , Sequences
variable h
varsH
∆
= 〈vars , h〉
InitH
∆
= Init ∧ (h = [i ∈ Readers 7→ 〈〉])
memBar
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→ imem[i ][1]]
BeginWrH (i , cmd)
∆
= BeginWr(i , cmd) ∧ (h′ = h)
DoWrH (i)
∆
= ∧DoWr(i)
∧ h′ = [j ∈ Readers 7→
if h[j ] = 〈〉
then 〈〉
else Append(h[j ], memBar ′)]
EndWrH (i)
∆
= EndWr(i) ∧ (h′ = h)
BeginRdH (i)
∆
= ∧ BeginRd(i)
∧ h′ = [h except ! [i ] = 〈memBar〉]
Rd1H (i)
∆
= Rd1(i) ∧ (h′ = h)
Rd2H (i)
∆
= Rd2(i) ∧ (h′ = h)
TryEndRdH (i)
∆
= ∧ TryEndRd(i)
∧ h′ = if rdVal1[i ] = rdVal2[i ]
then [h except ! [i ] = 〈〉]
else h
NextH
∆
=
∨ ∃ i ∈ Readers : BeginRdH (i) ∨ Rd1H (i) ∨ Rd2H (i) ∨ TryEndRdH (i)
∨ ∃ i ∈ Writers : ∨ ∃ cmd ∈ RegVals : BeginWrH (i , cmd)
∨DoWrH (i) ∨ EndWrH (i)
SpecH
∆
= InitH ∧ ✷[NextH ]varsH
Figure 26: Beginning of module AfekSimplifiedH.
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wstateBar
∆
= [i ∈ Writers 7→
if (interface[i ] = NotRegVal) ∨ (wrNum[i ] = imem[i ][2])
then NotRegVal
else interface[i ]]
NLS
∆
= instance NewLinearSnapshot
with mem ← memBar , rstate ← h, wstate ← wstateBar
theorem SpecH ⇒ NLS !SafeSpec
Figure 27: End of module AfekSimplifiedH.
ory value obtained from imem in the obvious way, by letting memBar [i ] equal
the first element of imem[i ]. The expression memBar is, of course, the value
substituted for mem by the refinement mapping.
The rest of the refinement mapping is defined at the end of the module,
shown in Figure 27. It substitutes h for rstate. The expression wstateBar is
substituted for wstate. To understand it, remember that in SSpecNL, the value
of wstate[i ] for a writer i is NotRegVal except between a BeginWr(i , cmd) action
and a DoWr(i) action, when it equals interface[i ] (which equals cmd).
The theorem was checked by TLC in about 10 hours on a circa 2012 laptop,
using a model with: two readers, two writers, and two register values; symmetry
of readers and writers (register values aren’t symmetric because IntRegVal equals
one of them); a state constraint limiting each writer to at most three writes; and
two worker threads.
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